In which case it's a good thing Larrikin has a well defined definition of "political arguments with sound reasons" we can use in legislation.
Snark aside, this post steps over and then directly back into the "who determines what's acceptable speech?" problem. Few will disagree with your extreme example, but your extreme example isn't what people are worried about.
To hell with the people who actually advocate nazi ideology - I'm a lot more worried about what the overreaction to their stupidity will bring, that overreaction being a much more clear and present danger.
So then let them say it and make fools of themselves.
I'm well of paradox of tolerance and it doesn't apply to free speech. Free speech is what keeps the nazis at bay, it's not what gives them power. It's why hitler and the nazis hated free speech and it's why they banned it.
If you tolerate hate speech, there's no paradox: you can do so, without surrendering the protection against intolerance for those members that speech targets.
While I can understand the motivation to interpret it this way, it seems directly counter to Popper:
> In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force…
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_tolerance#Discussio...
The rest of that quote does mesh well with my take on this: "Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. — In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise".
(Indeed, as Popper himself notes, this is a very straightforward reformulation of the paradox of freedom, whereby you need to suppress the actions of some people that are aimed at reducing the freedom of other people - so you need to reduce freedom for some to maximize freedom for all.)
Another way to approach it is via definitions. Tolerating something means putting up with it. Tolerance is generally deemed to be different from acceptance - to tolerate something means not trying to persecute it or otherwise stamp it out by violence, whereas acceptance is to acknowledge something as proper. But from there follows that intolerance is an action - merely holding some opinion, or even letting it known that you do, is not per se intolerance. "I will not tolerate X" implies that you're willing to act to prevent X from happening. If and when you do, the paradox of tolerance kicks in - people who want to maximize tolerance, have to act themselves, to restrict your acts - thereby being intolerant towards your intolerance. But if you don't act, suppressing your freedom of conscience or of expression is intolerance of dissenting opinion, not intolerance of intolerance.