There are two forms of this assurance.
The first is running into some guy at a party, or on an internet message board, who either works at Google or "knows a guy" who does, who then spends thirty or forty minutes semi-drunkenly rambling at you about how the security at Google is "military grade" and everything is "locked down" and they have some guy who used to run the Mossad in charge of internal security and he's the best guy ever and nothing or no one ever breaks in and that shit's a fortress. Trust the semi drunken ramblings of this guy you just met, your secrets are safe with the big G.
The second form of this assurance is only giving the third party indistinguishable encrypted blobs of data. They can look at them all they want, it doesn't mean anything to them. You don't need to trust anyone, let alone some guy you found on the Internet and transitively a few hundred anonymous computer programmer and IT janitors spread across the world.
Go figure, some people are more persuaded by the second argument. Even if you're reading this and you work at G and you know that the ex-Mossad security guys are digitally looking over your shoulder and you shake your fist at this screen muttering "you don't know how much we have it locked down here, clueless Hacker News commentator" you have to realize, somewhere in your heart of hearts, that a zero trust solution is preferable when you are trying to maximize for security.