The author of the document and others have also admitted that nobody thought the document would ever be put to use - it is not a battle tested document. And it's silent on whether it can be unilaterally revoked or not.
But as a matter of law the weight of opinion leans in favour of the option of unilateral revocation as long as it meets the principle of sincere cooperation. Unilateral revocation as a means of extracting additional concessions runs foul of that, so it really only works if it is part of a genuine u-turn.
Imagine though if the leaving member decided to revoke A50 as a means of resetting the negotiation or forcing the EU into concessions: it wouldn't work. Any subsequent attempt to withdraw by the member will be met with a much harsher EU. No additional legal devices are needed to drive this home. The EU can decide to impose bigger concessions, more conditions and higher costs to any future agreement. The leaving member needs a deal at some point, so the EU will always have the upper hand here they are just more likely to raise the costs on the leaving member if it engages in such shenanigans.