Uber Paid Hackers to Delete Stolen Data on 57M People
bloomberg.com
bloomberg.com
Don't check secrets into VCS, folks!
[1] https://help.github.com/articles/requiring-two-factor-authen...
One snippet of the email the article didn't mention was that Sullivan's firing happened pretty much right after Dara learned of the breach and an investigation was conducted. It definitely inspires more confidence in leadership seeing that the CEO will not tolerate unethical behavior.
In an organization of about 200 engineers across various products, 1000+ github repos, and 10 or so different CI systems. We enforce 2FA at github. I can still easily see how someone could easily gain access to source code with secrets in it.
> Kalanick, Uber’s co-founder and former CEO, learned of the hack in November 2016, a month after it took place, the company said.
I don't know if they were using GHE. If they were, at the time it did not come with a good way for them to enforce 2FA for users.
I don't know how to feel knowing that there is even one software-focused company out there that doesn't enforce 2fa on its github accounts. Like... how?! Why?!
If that were the case, there would be no authentication whatsoever to access the closed-source site; the hacker would have just needed to guess the right url.
Edit: I mean it would surprise me if it wasn't recommended practice, but it would also surprise me if it was somehow strictly enforced.
The attacker can submit your info to GitHub the moment you submit to the malicious site. You receive the token via SMS as expected, enter it on the second page of the malicious site, granting them access.
I am thinking now would be a good time to port it to working with webhooks as well.
The tool would have blocked the aws credentials from being checked in: https://github.com/opnfv/releng-anteater/blob/master/master_...
One you can use something like keypass to store a database in a shared location if you don't trust the SaaS offerings.
If you are looking at storing credentials for automation purposes, and don't have a secret store built in, you could look at something like Hashicorp Vault to help provide this for you
Sometimes I just go on google hangouts and share my screen if I'm feeling lazy.
Removing the secrets from the repository is nice to have, but not that necessary - what is mandatory is to ensure that the compromised secrets are no longer useful, since they aren't secret any more and won't be ever again.
> Warning: Once you have pushed a commit to GitHub, you should consider any data it contains to be compromised. If you committed a password, change it! If you committed a key, generate a new one.
Is a good argument as to why you shouldn't let users erase this data from history, it's already out there so no matter how painful or convoluted your process is for regenerating auth credentials is, you need to do it if you've published them into your SCM. If the process is painful you might want to simplify it because you'll probably need to do it sometime in the future again... yes even you large corporate workers who have no control over credential regeneration, an arduous process leads to credential sharing between projects which is another horrible thing.
I suppose? But at this point they have your code base. You are so owned at that point.
Quick google yielded this https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets
If someone gains access to a system that uses the credentials, then there is, in principle, no difference between puppeteering that system versus stealing its credentials.
Ok, how do you handle a bootstrap problem?
The "I didn't know, I just took a vast salary to play golf" argument should not be any kind of defence. If there is the real prospect of going to jail, golfers will resign, those who take the job would actually take an interest and have the ability to do so.
An idea whose time has come.
No sensible person would sign up for the CSO position if they risked jail time when their company gets hacked. You can't really control it. A random engineer could make a mistake that gets hackers a step closer. Or it could be a zero-day vulnerability that nobody knows how to protect against.
There are millions of motivated adversaries out there and a finite number of employees at your company to outsmart them. It's a game you can't win. The larger your company becomes, the broader your attack surface becomes, and the higher value a target you become.
You just have to hope that when you get hacked, it is a "forgiveable" hack like a zero-day or highly targeted attack.
If CSO's are to be personally accountable for the malicious actions of others, it needs to be due to clear negligence on their part and the responsibilities need to be clearly defined.
We're talking about cover up, if you cover up the fact someone stole private data belonging to other people you took responsibility for. If you try and pretend it didn't happen because you might get away with it then claim you didn't know when it comes out? Then yes, absolutely, you deserve to risk jail time for that. As does your board of directors.
CSOs, senior management, boards of directors should be personally responsible for their own actions. They need to have something at stake that they really dread losing when making the decision "perhaps we can get away with this?"
And how do you make that scale? If I miss a semicolon and leak 5 people's data, then I'd hardly get any jail time. If I miss a semicolon and leak 150,000,000 people's data, I will die in prison. In both scenarios, I made the same error, but the outcomes were insanely different!
So how does one draw the lines between bad luck, reasonable security problems, everyday poor performance, civil liability, and criminal negligence?
> A random engineer could make a mistake that gets hackers a step closer
That could be prevented, to a large extent, with much tighter controls. Of course, those controls would greatly increases the cost of operations and other things.
Is it possible we're all accustomed to the wrong model, that our standard of IT security is like the standard of car safety in the early auto industry (and maybe until the 1970s) - far too lenient? Maybe we should be facing the potential fact that the normal cost of IT should include those controls and other security expenses.
By analyzing how they prepared for the inevitable attack (mitigation), as well as how they respond to it after the fact.
Sure they can. It is called "insurance". Sort of like malpractice. CSO wants to get paid millions of dollars? Excellent, either be personally on the hook or have an insurance company that would be willing to underwrite your method of dealing with it, be that having your own crack team of people who get to oversee everything, or relying on Jr system admins from your company or whatever else.
I think that's a very sad commentary on how little your company values security.
OP's a realistic. His perspective is nothing to do with how a company values security.
No one in security assumes they won't get hacked, we assume we will and when we do get compromised. Our metrics aren't measured on if, our success metrics are:
* How quickly we find out * How much damage we can mitigate * How quickly we mitigate the risks and controls for X vulnerability and * How we incorporate our reporting to find trends to find the event quicker next time
Now we report on many compromises. I'm not talking just about data breaches here, there's a whole spectrum of compromises that we manage and mitigate.
I don't know anyone who operates in Security who has a different mindset to OP.
This has nothing to do with not valuing security, it's just about being realistic. Can you guarantee that your company is hacker-proof? No? Then we're on the same page.
If you don't assume that you will be hacked, then you won't design in auditing, alerting and containment that will tell you when you've been hacked, let you determine what data was compromised, and prevent the attacker from having free reign over all of your systems.
Otherwise, you'll be like a former coworker that refused to secure internal systems because "We paid a lot of money for our firewall, it's going to block any hackers". It took me less than 30 minutes on my first day to hack the login passwords of senior executives because they logged into a non-SSL reporting server (and I did through a simple MAC overflow attack on a network switch from a network port in the break room)
Also, the personal liability for board members and managers is something that is exceedingly pursued by shareholders and creditors (for the financial liability) and prosecutors (for the criminal liability) compared to how it used to be.
I don't think it matters much, though.
You cant just give Jail-time for data breeches. It would encourage cover ups and scape goats. Also never underestimate just how disorganised large organisations are, incompetence at addressing issues is systemic and goes far beyond data protection. What seems like malice is sometimes just plain stupidity.
It has to be backed by some sort of regulatory framework. Just like a fire code or employment rights. But crafted in a way that it doesnt end up like PCI, ratings agencies or financial auditors. IE creating an industry that sells compliance and not actual security.
Perhaps something light, like mandetory minimum bug-bounty schemes for all companies, where fines (or more) are imposed for not addressing issues and an independant regulator works with larger companies to resolve issues (or penalise the company severely if they deliberately wont).
The reasonable company director should have known X and when found out was bound to report it. Person Y did not report it, should have known as it was their job to know and there aren't extenuating circumstances. Guilty. 6 months. Next case.
"I don't know anything about this company I accept 7 figure sums to oversee as a director." Should never be any kind of legal defence. If senior management and directors have something personally at risk you'll see vastly improved behavior. Right now we're selecting for the opposite and seeing the inevitable results.
There is a story like this about directors and management cover ups every single day
Who will fill the void ? People who are overconfident and people who are not scared of going to jail.
It's much better to impose financial penalties. Should the directors or the shareholders pay ? Let them figure it out between themselves!
For example, the Target credit card breach occurred because malware intercepted the credit card information at the Point of Sale appliances before the information was encrypted and transmitted.
Prison time seems extreme, but Congress should should absolutely establish statutory fines (for companies) for breaches of PII. Then any company officer can save the company money by simply spending more on prevention because it will lower breach insurance premiums.
WEll that's already happening without jail time so maybe give it a whirl. LEt's get real here, the idea of suits going to jail is just scary to some people but it'll be fine.
This happened more than a year ago, and only now that they're planning on offering identity theft protection? That's ridiculous.
"Sorry we left uranium in your house a year ago and didn't bother telling you. Here's a coupon for free cancer screenings."
I don't think the average Joe is up to date with this news, or even care about.
I would never work as an engineer for a company like that. How can I trust that it will honor any deal I make and not screw me? I have to think about that with every company but this one in particular can’t even spell ”integrity”.
I expect blowback. I expect negative news. They essentially pulled it off by looking at every day as combat where fighting dirty was rewarded.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/13/uber-ceo-...
Who are getting screwed.
Having to register for that is quite surreal.
To be fair, they weren't spying on their customers. They were fingerprinting phones which is against the Apple ToS.
"As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Trump approaches 1"
Edit: allow me to replace the word "found" with "created." I was just using a figure of speech.
I’d normally say eventually it’d bite you if you fall into the habit and do it on a public repo by accident but it looks like it can bite you on a private one too.
Manage your secrets. Use something like Vault[1] or Pass[2] they’re free and awesome projects.
I keep all of my secrets even non-prod ones in one of these two because if you think about it, even your “non-prod” github credentials are kinda prod since you have access to code.
1- https://www.vaultproject.io/
2- https://www.passwordstore.org/
Also when it comes to AWS secrets, give your developers read only access, make them turn on MFA and assume a role that scopes permissions to the work they need to do.
Leaking AWS secrets is really asking for it. The amount of bots that consistently scan public git repos and then use the credentials to spin up massive instances to mine crypto currency is impressive. I’ve seen it do upwards of $10000 in AWS usage within five minutes of the commit containing the credentials.
"In January 2016, the New York attorney general fined Uber $20,000 for failing to promptly disclose an earlier data breach in 2014. After last year’s cyberattack, the company was negotiating with the FTC on a privacy settlement even as it haggled with the hackers on containing the breach, Uber said. The company finally agreed to the FTC settlement three months ago, without admitting wrongdoing and before telling the agency about last year’s attack."
If I was running the FTC, I would not settle this time, because it's blatantly obvious Uber was acting in bad faith last time around.
Seems to suggest they committed AWS credentials into source control?
Folks should be using short lived aws tokens to avoid the possibility of having tokens in source control: http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentia...
Because you know...20k really really hurts for a company like Uber.
The result was that more parents were late. The reason being that the parents effectively considered the fine a "late pickup fee", and one they were more than willing to pay. If the parents were fined a day's daycare fee for being ten minutes late you can bet their attitude would change.
I see company fines in the same light - they formalise the process of absolving responsibility and moving on. Just pay the toll and continue to handle your customer data cavalierly.
The day care changed what was a social incentive for an economic one, and then couldn't reverse the consequences: Not fining the parents anymore didn't reduce the number of late ones to previous levels.
... as I sit in my home office, just over an hour away from day care closing time I assure you I'm watching the clock like a hungry hawk watching a mouse. See, my kid's day care charges a mere $600 per hour late (billed in 1 minute increments).
I don't see kids parents late that often :-) and we've come close to missing it, but haven't in two years.
I think it was AT&T or Verizon that got fined the "record" $3 million by the FTC for tracking users' browsing behaviors for like 2 or 3 years.
The FTC should have asked (subpoena I should say) the company for reports on how much money it made per user from that tracking for the whole period, and then charge it a multiples of that.
Did it make $1 billion? Charge it $2 or $3 billion.
And do this sort of stuff across industries with a regular occurrence, so that companies can "expect" such audits, and so they don't just think it's a one in a decade fine that maybe one company in the industry will get.
I think you'll see abusive behavior drastically reduce.
The real question in this story is this: If you find that you have customers who are willing to pay you more for providing more service ... why not provide that service? You get more money, your staff gets paid overtime, parents get peace of mind, everyone's happy.
especially when the cost of doing the right thing is higher.
i mean look at HSBC - laundered trillions of dollars of mega-organized-crime money. for a decade. 400m dollar fine probably isnt even .01% of what they made off that endeavor
https://www.gdpr.associates/data-breach-penalties/
"There will be two levels of fines based on the GDPR. The first is up to €10 million or 2% of the company’s global annual turnover of the previous financial year, whichever is higher. The second is up to €20 million or 4% of the company’s global annual turnover of the previous financial year, whichever is higher.
The Parliament had requested for fines to reach €100 million or 5% of the company’s global annual turnover. The agreed fines are the compromise that was reached."
Why do big firms get off easier than the smaller firms?
Huge fines do exactly what they’re intended to do. JPM for instance responded by making legitimate operational changes to detect all manner of financial malfeasance within their organization.
Other than the sexist nonsense of the CEO, there really is an irrational hatred of Uber. Are many of us secretly moonlighting as cab drivers?
Uber’s nonsense is minuscule compared to generations of taxi corruption.
This isn’t me excusing Uber but it does seem like many people, especially Europeans have an inordinate amount of glee over anytime AirBnB or Uber get in trouble. Has the hacker ethic really devolved into statism?
We should be cheering over disruption of the status quo. Does anyone actually long for the days of getting ripped off by over-regulated and over taxed hotels and taxis?
Do you people actually like having government pick winners and losers? Do you actually trust government to do the right thing? Governments have a strong track record of stifling innovation, abridging freedom and giving regulatory handouts to the privileged classes. People here get all kinds of sanctimonious when it comes to patents and copyrights yet seem to fall firmly on the side of the entrenched incumbents when it comes to things like disrupting hotels and taxis. It’s a weird double standard; a hatred of government when they want to prevent people from stealing movies, but a love of government when they want to prop-up taxis and hotels.
About that time my Uber account was 'hacked' and someone kept requesting rides in Florida and I had to cancel them as fast as they made them.
I emailed Uber support and they got back to my 3 days later.
Then someone proceeded to try to gain access to every account I had with that email and password (yeah, yeah, I know). The next worse was someone getting into my DigitalOcean account and launching an instance.
It has finally settled down, I occasionally get alerts from people trying to break into something but lots of 2FA and no shared passwords anymore.
I am not sure if this was Uber's fault or another site's but the timeframe of Oct 2016 lines up.
(But in all likelihood the poster's account was just compromised through the usual means, otherwise there would be more reports of hacked accounts.)
You should check over all of your accounts and machines - I doubt it has anything to do with this leak
I do not get why there is no legal action taken against Uber or even steps to shut it down.
So much of the stuff violate basic laws how to run a business, apart from the humongous flaws in Ubers ethics and damaging effects on society.
Small companies will instantly get sued and pay fees ruining them for this things. And that already the 1st time it happens. For Uber this is beyond ten finger counting in terms of issues in the past two years.
It is just not having any consequences and by now from the legal side you can conclude that Uber is a repeated offender which has not learned anything from previous cases.
So, my point stands. When will this actually lead to consequences and justice being served?
I know Joe (the ousted CISO). I’ve known him for almost 15 years, and worked with him professionally in the past.
This is not like him. He was the most ethical lawyer I ever met. Everything was by the book. He cares about privacy. He cares about users. He’s prosecuted the worst of the worst.
Something here isn’t right.
It is a telling example that the pain point of a bad taxi service in a city is usually enough for them to conformance rationalise that Uber is still a better alternative, despite any of these issues.
People have asked me before if I'm about "to uber" or "take an uber" someplace and they say it in an obvious way that implies "any ridesharing company" (or lyft in my case since most people know I only lyft nowadays).
Uber just as a word for ride-sharing has become ingrained and won't be easy to get rid of, IMO.
While money gives power, the concern is that it's concentrated in a small number of people. Voting is not, and can result in controls of essentially any level.
I plan to never use Uber again.
We fought all the battles, took a hit on our reputation and set it up nicely for Lyft who very smartly played along with the nice guy approach to capitalize. Net-net, no Uber would have most likely meant existing taxis everywhere and as most riders/drivers will tell you, there is nothing inherently better about either app, they offer the same, pay the same but vastly differ in perception.
That said, we took our aggressive attitude way too far. In an ideal world, Travis would have evolved or replaced himself a couple of years back once the company essentially reached escape velocity where our consumers themselves became our most fervent supporters. Unfortunately that did not play out and making a near perfect switch like that is probably unlikely.
Given this important context, I hope you will give Uber another chance as in the end, Dara and the employees are genuinely trying to evolve by doing the right things and putting all of this behind us. You can get some sense of this from going to sites like reddit.com/r/uberdrivers (or r/lyft) and seeing the changing perception at least from the driver side of things.
That said, almost all of the notable legislative and regulatory battles were conducted and won by Uber.
The wrongful actions by companies do get forgiven eventually, as toxic executives leave (as in the case of the CEO, Legal Officer, and now the CSO), but no public is foolish enough to immediately absolve any company of wrongdoing. Uber will have a reputation for sexual harassment long after it meets or exceeds the standards of other large companies.
It's not like Uber did one bad thing. Uber has been a fountain of terrible things for years and years. You even admit that Uber's market-dominant position has been been achieved through those terrible things. And those are only the terrible things that we've discovered despite Uber's energetic attempts to cover things up. Lord knows what horrors you're still hiding.
Until Uber loses their ill-gotten lead, I won't even consider using them.
I'm not defending uber, but this kind of attitude is exactly what got Trump elected. You can't generalize and demonize entities based on one person's view.
Not really seeing the connection here
[1] https://www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-holds-the-world-record-of-...
EDIT: I realize I sound far more judge-y than intended in these posts. My overall point is that people should just do whatever makes 'em happy while doing the best you can (w.r.t. everything else). Trying to emphasize the morality in your actions is just wrong, imo.
[1] tbh I don’t think you do, but I like the analogy so I’m keeping it.
The Joe Sullivan details are the lurid stuff that propels news story copy, but the important takeaway is that almost nobody, including companies with serious investments in security, can safely get a large-scale dev team deploying onto AWS.
This story keeps getting re-told, and has been for something like 5 years now. It's a problem, and it needs to get fixed, decisively.
You're definitely on to something here. While I wouldn't call AWS security "broken," it is next to impossible to implement it correctly in any medium to large size business. There are 30+ services that AWS provides, each with an infinite number of security controls, JSON-based policies, etc. Cross-service access is even worse. Almost every service has some form of sub control that extends or complements the main security tool (IAM). KMS has key policies, ECR has registry policies, SNS has delivery policies, etc. S3 has perhaps the most confusing permission policy in existence, which has led to scores of high profile hacks this year alone.
There are 12+ public regions now, with more coming every few months, each fully enabled, yet segregated within the UI and API (which makes detecting attackers who have embedded themselves in unused regions more difficult).
All it takes is literally one typo in a single user's policy and leaked credentials and you're environment is completely compromised. Recovery is next to impossible without basically starting from scratch because you'll never find every tiny hole the attacker left as a backdoor for later without combing through GB of CloudTrail logs.
Now take all that, put it in an organization with 500+ engineers and you can see how easy it is for this to happen. Think you're safe by putting each team in their own account? Well AWS supports cross account role provisioning and engineers can easily set that up within their accounts. The spider web of issues is endless.
That doesn't match with the rest of your comment. At all. What would you call broken, then?
This got to be a running joke now. Companies lose the data and offer credit/theft protection than facing the consequences. If Equifax could get away with the giant breach, I am sure Uber will not even feel the heat. smh.
One co-worker is covered by no less than four groups who failed to look out for him earlier, all for trusting companies to not screw up PII or remember that data is a liability.
> Two hackers had stolen data about the company’s riders and drivers — including phone numbers, email addresses and names — from a third-party server, putting the personal data of more than 57 million people at risk. The hackers approached Uber and demanded $100,000 to delete their copy of the data [...].
> Uber acquiesced to the demands. Under the orders of Travis Kalanick, who was then its chief executive, and Joe Sullivan, the chief security officer, the company paid the ransom.
> Then Uber went further. The company tracked down the hackers and pushed them to sign nondisclosure agreements [...]. To further conceal the damage, Uber executives also made it appear as if the payout had been part of a “bug bounty” [...].
And if you're interested, a gif of the data:
If it was paid to hackers it's unlikely that finance cut a check. I'm imagining this was paid in bitcoin or similar. How was this able to be approved?
I'm guessing someone created a fake invoice? Wouldn't that constitute fraud?
If they got it approved as such don't you think the CEO would have been informed that there was line item from Security for ransom?
The article states the CEO didn't find out about the hack until a month after.
- This is not Equifax, which leaked hundreds of millions SSN; or LinkedIn, which leaked hashed password of millions[1]; or Yahoo, which leaked personal information of billions, including security questions and hashed passwords [2]; or Target, which affected 40MM credit cards [3].
"Compromised data [..] included names, email addresses and phone numbers of 50 million Uber riders around the world, [..] including some 600,000 U.S. driver’s license numbers. No Social Security numbers, credit card information, trip location details or other data were taken"
- There is no gross incompetence. The breach was due to an AWS access key in a private github repo. I bet you can find enough developers in this forum who store sensitive information in private GitHub repos without git encryption, and who may or may not feel guilty, because of the (false) sense of safety given by 1) the guarantee of github private repo and 2) the fact that access keys can be revoked and are generally handled with less care.
- The response by the new CEO is decisive and timely. The CSO was fired on the same day the CEO learned about the incident. There is also internal review, new advisor, and reasonable protection offered to the drivers affected, even though there is no indication the data is leaked beyond the thief, and driver license numbers are not the best for identify theft.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_LinkedIn_hack
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahoo!_data_breaches
[3] https://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-dezenhall/a-look-back-at...
I can not imagine he would be on board with negotiating with the hacker, and cannot imagine him sitting idly for a year after the cover up.
A lot more will likely leak out now. Iceberg tip located.
I've stopped using any credit card numbers for anything ditial. I can change paypal passwords weekly If I'm that paranoid.
Why on earth would a software-based company like Uber that stores a boatload of confidential employee and customer information on its servers put a non-technical person of any sort, lawyer or not, in charge of its security team?
Instead of giving cash bribe, bribe with cushy jobs with high salary and no real responsibility, since no one would expect a lawyer to understand what even to delegate to members of IT security team.
A white hat hacker you have an agreement with on how the data should be handled is the same as an employee who has access to the same data, where you also have an agreement on the employees use of the data.
You might say "Ooh, but can you trust the hacker not to keep a copy of the data!?!", but it's exactly the same as saying "Can you trust the employee not to copy the data?". I don't think a company would announce a data breach just because the database administrator had access to a backup tape...
Having said that, you raise an interesting point, because if this money was paid as a bug bounty, then perhaps the lines would be blurred again. I guess the difference is that a bug bounty would have more clearly defined parameters about how far the hack should go. Logging into AWS using credentials that were found lying around, then continuing on to download data, seems like it is beyond the realm of reasonable bug-bounty hunting and responsible disclosure.
Anonymously extorting a company after stealing its data is a black-hat activity any way you look at it.
If Uber didn't have a bounty program or responsible disclosure policy, and the hackers didn't download the user data, but reported it in a manner consistent with other responsible disclosures after discovering a means to access, then it would be grey-hat at best.
> You might say "Ooh, but can you trust the hacker not to keep a copy of the data!?!", but it's exactly the same as saying "Can you trust the employee not to copy the data?".
I trust someone I vetted and hired a hell of a lot more than the person who just extorted $100K from me.
If it is as you describe, do you think the public would understand and react differently?
Hacks of this magnitude, especially in other cases where they involve credit card information, cause millions in damages ultimately, however the black hats involved (the initial part of that chain of events) sell that data for much less. Could we cut the losses there, by paying the hackers? Would it be legal? It could be a more serious version of a bug bounty.
"That gist is believed to have contained a login key used by a hacker to access an internal Uber database of 50,000 drivers."
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_gith...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/technology/uber-hack.html
...
I wonder if it is a good time to start a role at Uber or Lyft? I’m not sure which one I would pick.
http://www.mass.gov/ago/doing-business-in-massachusetts/priv...
Gotta be careful dealing with company like Uber. At some price point they might just hire hitmen to kill you instead.
--
[1] Income tax, unemployment insurance, healthcare, and maybe even pension. All going to the benefit of the country as there is no identifiable human on the receiving end.
This is so baffling coming from one of the largest tech companies in the world.
Among other things, this shows that they do not have proper access policies to user data (e.g anybody working at Uber can get access to any user's data), which in my opinion is a larger issue than this individual hacking case.
see
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/03/god-view...
https://www.cnet.com/news/god-view-under-spotlight-as-uber-i...
and
https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-lawsuit-alleges-startup-track...
Other tech companies (e.g Google) safely silo PII data, and any access has to be audited.
I cannot wait before GDPR is implemented in Europe... at least companies will be seriously fined if they want to cut corners on privacy and data protection.
Private github sites are private as in hidden. Not as in digitally encrypted bank vault.
What sort of tech company doesn't go for a self hosted git option anyway!?
Like Gitlab which comes with CI to keep the whole thing private.
Also self hosting allows an arbitrary level of security..
I am wondering what private Github coding site stands for? If it is GitHub Enterprise, then how those hackers would even access it from outside of the uber network? Does it mean that they had access to Uber's VPN as well?
Except when you actually steal data, you're not eligible to bounty. This means the hackers had decent leverage and negotiation skills (maybe Uber could've scared them with lawyers, etc).
maybe a yearly most evil corp awards.
because it looks like uber is relentlessly bad.
So this was willful. Expect many more exits.
Really? Evidence of deletion?
For starters, Chiquita Bananas intimidated farmers and union leaders with AK 47s and hired militias in Colombia [1].
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Fruit_Company#Aiding_...
Really? Really? Come on!!!
can't even lolz
We really need to change.
The kool-aid wore off and everyone realized it never had any meaning to begin with.
Redhat also stopped including JSMin for the same reason. [1]