Yes, and you can abstract that observation from blockchains to cryptography in general, which is the underlying foundation of blockchain technology’s game theoretic fault tolerance. This is particularly clear once you move closer to cryptography’s theoretical and mathematical foundations and away from specific applications (such as encryption or authentication).
Many cryptography textbooks begin with an elementary definition and discussion of the field using notions such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, etc. These are all correct, but I prefer Oded Goldreich’s definition, from his Foundations of Cryptography:
Cryptography is concerned with any problem in which one wishes to limit the effects of dishonest users.
In an abstract sense, cryptography has a direct mapping from game theory, and can be considered the use of computational complexity to resolve scenarios in adversarial relationships.
If you’re enjoying looking at blockchains through this lens, you might want to read a few papers on cryptogenography, or zero knowledge proofs (the latter has far more literature). There is also a lot of fun research that uses game theory to model fault tolerance and economics in blockchains.
"It is often asserted (for example, in the Bitcoin white paper [22]) that a cartel can double-spend Bitcoins. In a strict sense, this is true: a cartel can spend a Bitcoin by paying it to a player Alice, receiving goods or services, and then shifting the consensus choice of history to a branch where that coin is instead paid to a different player Bob...
Bitcoins have value because people are willing to trade them for goods and services. If players were unwilling to accept Bitcoins for trade or unwilling to spend Bitcoins for fear of having their payments nullified, the value of Bitcoins would diminish significantly as players lost confidence in the system...
Worse, because players are encouraged to generate a new identity for each transaction and because identities are not linked to any side information, players cannot easily determine whether a proffered payment is coming from the double-spending cartel or an honest user.
A rational player should refuse to accept any payments when there is a significant threat of double-spending. As a cartel must outmine the entire Bitcoin network and thus outspend the entire Bitcoin network for as long as it would remain a cartel, we believe it is very unlikely that a cartel could double-spend enough to recover the cost of the attack."
The question at this stage, with the price of Bitcoin so high, is if this rationale still holds. What if a cartel were able to double spend one (or multiple) of the big 40 "whale" Bitcoin accounts before destroying the entire network? The one-time billion dollar theft could offset the cost of putting together the computing power to pull off a 51% attach, especially if the cartel assembled that power maliciously through a botnet.
[1] http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers/KrollDave...
I don't think 51% attacks work that way. You can't spend at all without the private keys of the whales because the network nodes won't trust the chain. If they have enough power, they can double spend their own coins by rewinding the history till the point they are spent. This is why around 6 blocks time is considered as a must to prevent double spends. In fact as the price increases the lost opportunity cost also increases (they could have just mined and gotten the reward instead of attacking). How ever, there are still players out of the net currently who don't care about the rewards and have enough hash power (governments). It's just that at this point of time they are ambivalent to the little monster that is growing up before their eyes (like a cute little dinosaur).
Here is a simple library to recover the private key of ECDSA and DSA signatures sharing the same nonce k and therefore having identical signature parameter r
But - some miners and mining pool operators are rumored to be among the bigger Bitcoin whales themselves. They already own (or at least control) a large part of the ASIC hashing power. None of them is even close to 51% today, but then you also don't really need 51% to pull off a double-spend attack, 30-40% should do it, as long as you pull that hashing power from the legit network at the same time. A cartel made up of the top miners and mining pool owners should be able to comfortably reach this critical mass of hash power. So effectively it comes down to whether they assume that it's better for them financially to continue supporting the networks' health or to pull a one-time heist, destroying the networks' credibility in the process. For the moment, the former seems to be still true. But nobody knows for sure whether that may change some day...
EDIT: I am not saying this is a probable threat, but there are some risks associated with Bitcoin.
https://steemit.com/ethereum/@dhumphrey/update-f2pool-manipu...
These kinds of things look theoretical but might be happening in real life without any one knowing about it.
My impression is that right now, and for the last couple of years, this is untrue, with speculative demand vastly exceeding demand from people actually wanting to spend bitcoins on goods and services.
1 USD is worth .87 Euro or 1.3 Euro (at any given time), where 1 feels like a magic number; but 1 USD is worth (right now) 6.6 Yuan or 113 Yen, where it's more obvious 1 is not a magic number.
So I'm confused by the belief that .001 or .00001 is closer or further than where something 'should' be. How do we reach the conclusion that the value should be this thing or not this thing?
https://cointelegraph.com/news/satoshis-best-kept-secret-why...
but the problem is that it isn't really. Bitcoin coin cash implemented big block size to expand the transaction capacity. Meanwhile bitcoin stuck with the small block size.
As I recall, that has always been part of the dream. Plus the potential for early adopters to become unimaginably wealthy ;)