China is due to do a few interesting things in space over the next couple years. After that priorities are likely to change.
With adequate funding, it's not that bad. Just build modular ships, probes and landers. You can get more done by custom building, but a generic backbone can resist political changes.
If the focus goes back to robotic exploration, your lander can, at least, carry the robot. The same propulsion system that would take a crew to Mars could take a small probe to Pluto and slow it down so it can enter orbit. Or drop a couple smaller probes on its way out.
The design of the ISS changed as it was being built. We can certainly do the same with a craft that can leave Earth orbit.
Doesn't really take away from your argument, but it's worth mentioning.
Speaking in very broad terms, unmanned missions tend to have a significantly lower public profile up until the moment they reach their destination. Unmanned missions can die during budget battles, but that's usually the extent of things.
Manned missions, on the other hand, have a much higher profile throughout the entire process. They can take longer, are more expensive, and require additional political support from politicians who will in all likelihood not be in office to take credit for the mission's eventual success. There are also far greater PR incentives for an incoming administration to dabble with NASA policy in order to differentiate itself from the previous administration. It's relatively high profile, makes a new POTUS appear "presidential" and forward-thinking, and comes with very little political risk compared to other federal programs they could touch. Explaining that manned spaceflight missions are developed over the course of years, and that bold new policy proclamations are counterproductive is a tricky political argument to make. If someone attacks them for the policy changes, they get to just argue that NASA is still getting money and "working towards the future." Whether the changed goals ever come to fruition is largely secondary.
Which sucks, but it's the nature of long-term programs. JFK pushed NASA to the moon, but even if he hadn't been assassinated, he still wouldn't have been in office to for the moon landing. Nixon never once publicly acknowledged JFK's role. When there was a push to name the Apollo 11 craft after JFK, Nixon's congressional relations assistant Bryce Harlow quipped "we have gone far enough in ‘Kennedyizing’ the mission" while another senior advisor, John Ehrlichman noted "such an action would win us neither friends in Congress nor votes in 1972,” suggesting “fall prey to this and the next step will be renaming the moon because NBC thinks it would be a good idea." H.R. Haldeman killed the proposal, literally double underlining the point (Logsdon 14).
Despite everything that's been thrown in their way, and how election-oriented thinking can impact its missions, NASA has managed to continue pushing scientific boundaries since the beginning. That's damned impressive.
- Logsdon, John. After Apollo? Richard Nixon and the American Space Program.
But he real answer as pointed out by the sibling is to use a more academic model like NSF and NIH does, rather than flagship missions. Look at how the Discovery program authorizes planetary probes, for example. That approach could be done for flagship and human missions too.
NASA was created to fight communists. Now that there are no more communists, NASA continues to exist only as a form of corporate welfare.
Congress cares far more about where NASA sources from, then it does about what NASA does. The science (Which half of Congress doesn't believe in) is just an accidental side effect of keeping aerospace jobs in Georgia, Indiana, Arkansas, etc.
1. I believe that the Department of State's obsession with maintaining the American empire through globe-spanning military dominance is insane.
2. If I did not believe that #1 is insane, yes, I would say that NASA is playing an important role in the US offense industry. (Maybe? Who knows, it's all classified.)
3. Most of the people on HN who strongly support more funding for NASA do so out of either their scientific work, Star Trek romanticism, or both. Military applications rank a distant third.
Americans are proud of NASA, but in more of a broad, general sense than anything concrete. That pride doesn't translate very well into increased monetary support. On the contrary, even though every dollar is spent "here on Earth" (there are no orbital superstores, after all), there's still a pervasive attitude that the money is being sent "elsewhere." It's always been this way; just weeks after Apollo 11, a Newsweek poll showed that "56% [of 1,321 Americans with household incomes ranging from $5,000 to $15,000 a year] think the government should be spending less money on space exploration, and only 10% think the government should be spending more money." That was at the height of moon fever, when Americans were giddy with a sense of accomplishment. Give voters a binary choice, and space funding will always lose.
For congress, think of NASA as a big bag of money they'd love to play with. The public sort-of loves NASA enough to give it a thin safety margin, to the extent that no politician wants to be the heartless bastard who snuffed out everybody's childhood dreams, but not enough to give it much additional support. Many members of congress of even agree with NASA's importance in principle. NASA is a big, bold example of American accomplishment and ingenuity. But they've all got their own ideas on how some of NASA's funding could be used elsewhere.
The "pork" aspect, even if it means continuing with SLS development despite not having a clear purpose and mission for it, gives NASA a base of political support that it'd otherwise lack. It might mean less science as a result, but that's not the bargain being offered to NASA. They certainly wouldn't get more money if they could eliminate the pork and other inefficiencies forced on them.
STS and the Space Shuttle were a perfect example of the kind of faustian bargains NASA had to accept. Originally, NASA had no post-Apollo plans because they didn't want to lose focus. It wasn't until 1968 that things changed. Eventually, the post-Apollo plans were limited to STS, and even then, it was the promise of the Space Shuttle being able to perform national-security missions that helped it squeak by. That promise led to some pretty significant design compromises NASA didn't want, but they didn't have any other option. The alternative was no shuttle, not a better shuttle.
NASA exists within a very particular political and budgetary paradigm that is not friendly to it. It's easy to imagine a better NASA. Regrettably, that's not a NASA that's on the table. Instead, we have NASA as it is. It could be better, but it's accomplished a hell of a lot while managing to survive.
If you're at all interested in NASA's early battles after Apollo, I'll recommend (yet again) John Logsdon's books. They're an incredible insight into the challenges the public doesn't really see, and helped me rethink some of my earlier antagonism towards the Space Shuttle and aspects of NASA's manned space program.