Just how many of his eggs does he
need to keep in that one basket?
Many executives receive very high total compensation, but structure it in a certain way as a sort of fig leaf to pretend it's in the shareholder's interests.For example, instead of being paid $12,000,000 a CEO might pay themselves $2,000,000 in cash and award themselves $10,000,000 in stock. The fig leaf in that case is that it aligns his incentives with those of shareholders. There's totally not a principal-agent problem here, honest!
Selling all $10,000,000 of shares kinda reveals that fig leaf for what it is: giving himself the shares was never about aligning his incentives with shareholders - he just wanted the cash.
If shareholders' interests were represented competently and in good faith, you'd expect a very different incentive structure.
I'm curious, what is the very different compensation structure you'd propose?
That right there is the money quote for me that invalids my "pieces of flair" metaphor. You're right, the very best thing one might say about flipping the shares for cash is it's a bit crass; at best.
Also, I don't think the stock is a "fig leaf" -- it actually is in the shareholder's interests that CEOs hold a lot of stock. I can't think of any other explanation why the compensation of (non-founder) CEOs is so high. I suspect that if a CEO were to refuse to accept stock it would make shareholders uncomfortable. The stock is what incentivizes the CEO to act in the interest of shareholders when those are contrary to the interests of employees or customers.
My understanding is that the board is just other executives and CxO from peer companies. Think Eric Schmidt on the Apple Board or the disgraced Citi CEO John Thank on Uber's board. Neither of them represent our desire to minimize executive pay.
it actually is in the shareholder's
interests that CEOs hold a lot of stock
Absolutely. So why do they let him sell it?Really? Have you tried?
As a thought experiment, imagine (just hypothetically, of course) that companies were mostly run by grasping plutocrats, and members of the same group of greedy plutocrats sat on the boards of their friends' companies, and set their compensation.
And the low tax burden. The capital gains tax rate on those shares are 20% while if it was income, it would be taxed at 39.6% fed + whatever the state/city taxes are.
> If shareholders' interests were represented competently and in good faith, you'd expect a very different incentive structure.
The execs interests align with short term shareholders. Not the long term shareholders. It essentially fosters a pump-and-dump environment.
He knows what it means to cut down to bare minimum, and this could be considered a signal that he feels he could get more than the forecasted % elsewhere, and that he doesn't feel holding on to the stock is worth the negative backlash that is sure to happen with such a move.
Possibly. But it's possible that he did it on the assumption that US tech stocks are already overvalued and anticipates a correction soon.
Yes, he likely isn't "all in" on Intel stock right now, but does that necessarily mean that it's specifically Intel that he thinks has problems?
Or is he expected to believe that Intel shares are in fact so undervalued that they represent the best investment he could possibly make? Or to voluntarily maintain investments in what he believes is a comparatively suboptimal vehicle merely to "take one for the team"?
In other words, why would one expect, let alone demand, a CEO to make what he believes are poor financial decisions in his personal life?
As for being "invested in the company", once you reach the level of Fortune 50 CEO, the concept is basically nonsense: practically speaking, no matter how poorly you invest or perform, barring criminal prosecution, you'll still end up financially better off than nearly everyone else in the world, including many, if not all, of your peers.