Battle of the Clipper Chip (1994)
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
The next step was to either pass a law requiring key disclosure, our outlaw cryptography alltoegether. If you think that sounds far fetched... remember at the time this article was written they were trying to jail Phill Zimmerman for writing PGP.
Writing it or exporting it? Sure, their motivations may have been due to the former (is there even documentation for that?), but IIRC the technical reason was that, because it'd been made available online for anyone on the planet to download, they tried to pin "export of munitions" on Phil.
The law is pretty damn clear. Create strong encryption, go to jail.
And indeed, the law is pretty clear: export "munitions" (according to a list - at the time "strong encryption" was on the list) and you'll feel the wrath of Uncle Sam. But they dropped their case against Zimmerman. Never filed charges. Probably because there was no evidence that he was the one to export PGP.
I think the gub'mint might have a different opinion on that.
I used to have a GRiD Compass laptop computer that came to me via a friend of a friend of someone in the Reagan administration. On the back of it was a list of countries in which it was legal to operate or possess the computer, due to the software inside.
"Clipper was intended as a drop- in replacement for a standard DES chip, but with a new symmetric-key cipher algorithm, called Skipjack , designed by the National Security Agency and using an 80 bit key. But before any two Clipper chips could communicate, they would first exchange a Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) that contained a copy of the current session key, itself en- crypted with an “escrowed” Unit Key held by the govern- ment. Any Clipper-encrypted communication could thus be decrypted by government agents without needing to break the (presumably strong) Skipjack cipher. The agents would be able to recover the session key simply by decrypting the copy in the LEAF (which they would intercept along with the ciphertext) using their escrowed copy of the unit key"
It had a fatal flaw: a 16-bit checksum that could be brute-forced.
The documentary is excellent all around. Highly recommended. Possibly available on YouTube.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Curtis
[1] https://archive.org/details/TheCenturyOfTheSelfPart1
[2] https://archive.org/details/TheCenturyOfTheSelfPart2
The Clipper Chip was designed by the government to be used in phones in order to give people communications security—but not too much communications security against government entities—and to pre-empt and outcompete other cryptographic voice privacy solutions that people might want to adopt.
The IME is designed by Intel to allow remote management of PCs. It creates risks of unauthorized access to those computers, including by increasing the attack surface outside of (one might say "beneath") ordinary operating system security features.
I guess the parallel is that both are hardware-implemented device functionality that many users might not want and that could expose their data to risks they don't appreciate.
So there it is, a government-mandated encryption device that has a backdoor built in.
The IME is a well-intended system management feature that can be turned to nefarious purposes since it can go around all operating system security features, e.g. read or update all of the system's memory.