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Comment by zapt02 | Hacker News Reader

This just sound like the Intel Management Engine story waiting to happen again. A controller that handles camera, networking and is the "root of trust"? No thank you.

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The camera isn't a vector of attack, it's a thing to be attacked. The camera right now on desktop computers is wildly insecure, giving authority of it over to a secure enclave seems like a great way to finally start securing that path.

On the other hand, the ability to compromise the T2 chip would lend attackers the ability to use the camera outside of OS control and thus outside of user control.

At least with OS updates, it's possible to patch potential security vulnerabilites. Of course it's much harder to patch silicon, as we're seeing now.

You misunderstand. It runs "bridgeOS" which can be updated with Apple-signed firmware updates, and most certainly will be for security updates.

I actually want Apple to control the network stack, because I trust them more than Intel, or the other chip vendors. If I understand it correctly, they can now stop the Intel ME from sending stuff out? That would be very reassuring. Apple has a very strong stance against selling my data, and others don’t.

In what way is this similar to the IME story? Apple's history with the Secure Enclave on iOS devices leads me to believe that this will be much more secure and that a white paper will be forthcoming unlike Intel's complete opacity surrounding IME.

Do you truly believe Apples sophisticated security enclave with computer-like capabilities (and probably running a full OS) will have a manual and white-paper? This is the exact opposite of what Apple will do, they will lock it down and put it behind patents as they do best.

https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

https://images.apple.com/business/docs/FaceID_Security_Guide...

Seems pretty likely there will be a whitepaper and some conference talks about this as well.

You're linking a minimal manual which is required for corporate deployment, hardly anything Apple is being forthcoming about. I'm pretty sure you and I have different definitions of acceptable disclosure - unless Apple makes the entire chip possible to audit, I don't consider it to be acceptable.

A completely transparent audit like you're suggesting would compromise the majority of the security features of the enclave. The white paper gives enough about the mechanism to understand how it works without detailing specifics that would compromise the security of tech.

Are you joking? They already did release those things...

FYI when you patent something, it becomes public. Trade secrets keep it that way.

> This just sound like the Intel Management Engine story waiting to happen again

Excuse me, implementation details matter. Outcomes matter. Apple has deployed 10x more devices with no known breach or defect.

Except for when they forgot to require a password for root access to her OS...

And this has what to do with secure enclave?

If the answer is "nothing", then what does Apple shipping 10x the devices have to do with their ability to produce the world's only Secure Enclave implementation that isn't simply a warm cosy environment for malware?

Are you implying that Apple has deployed 10x more devices than Intel?

Yeah, this is all technology from iOS devices.

Even so, I somehow doubt that 15 years of iOS devices equals 30+ years of x86 devices.

You're right.

I was assuming the parent was thinking about Macs vs. Intel processors. Was just pointing out that the comparison of scale is iOS devices vs. Intel processors.

> iOS devices vs. Intel processors

There's no way there are 10x more iOS devices in circulation than Intel-based PCs

Annual PC shipments ( laptops + desktops ) are still above 250 million per year. No tablets haven't killed the market, they've killed growth.

Apple sells about 220 million iPhones per year. I don't know how many iPads; say half as many again?

"no known breach or defect"

Except for the many thousands that have been known, from every exploitable vulnerability that's allowed an iOS jailbreak to every security fix in every patch in the nearly two decades of OS X (and System 7/9/etc before that). These types of things are fairly complex pieces of software. It doesn't matter if the software is ultimately compiled to hardware circuitry or executed by a CPU -- bugs come from complexity, not from the medium.

1. You can opt to not utilize the security features offered.

2. This is not used for device management.

It is a SuperIO chip with on board co-processors that can inspect and modify data transferring to/from peripherals. It is most certainly used for management and capable of being compromised like the ME.

You have not refuted anything I said besides implying that I am wrong. Again:

- You can turn off functionality if you do not want it.

- There are no management or remote access capabilities.

- The only way to compromise it would require compromising the main CPU anyway, and persistence would be a whole other (major) challenge.

Ah, so you're saying this chip is guaranteed to not have its own TCP/IP stack, no access to the NIC, and no latent zero-days that a remote attacker can exploit?

That is correct enough, but now sure what “it’s own” means.

To be clear, this is not some mystery chip, it runs a derivative of iOS, and you can check out the firmware in /usr/standalone/firmware (You can even reverse engineer it if you have experience with ARM).

Do you not use Chrome because IE6 was insecure? This attitude doesn't seem like it leads anywhere other than not using computers.

I mean at the end of the day, something has to manage those devices.

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