Why?
Alternatively, if I shoot the clone, will the clone resume its consciousness in you? By what process?
Why?
Alternatively, if I shoot the clone, will the clone resume its consciousness in you? By what process?
What if we "clone" you by copying every other atom into a "left" clone, leaving the original in the right, and doing the reverse on the alternating atoms? Which resulting "clone" is you?
This way lies madness. Possibly twice.
Yes.
> Doesn't your consciousness basically dissolve and then reconstitute itself when "you" wake?
Yes.
> What about from second to second, between moments of inattention?
Yes.
> Are we relying on the "stability" of your constituent atoms?
Yes.
> On some "arrangement" of them?
Yes.
> On a particular locus of sensation (the goo in your brain pan)?
Yes.
> What if we "clone" you by copying every other atom into a "left" clone, leaving the original in the right, and doing the reverse on the alternating atoms? Which resulting "clone" is you?
My father replaced the handle, and I replaced the blade, but it's still my grandfather's axe?
Neither. You ripped my brain in half, I am dead.
What makes it the same consciousness as the yesterday one, if not all your memories, and past experiences? If my pure consciousness wakes up tomorrow in your body, with all your memories, will it be your consciousness then?
> unproductive debate about what consciousness is or is not
I'm just addressing the question of why you'd say yes: you might be ready to be put of your misery, and at that point, why would you say "no"? The resumption of "you" gets an afterlife, and nothing gets worse for the you that's about to die either way.
If the thing works like a computer, that is clone is truly identical, and time is just a counter, then there is nothing to resume the clone won't know that it was cloned, and the whole thing won't be much different from the normal passage of time, (except for seeing yourself killed won't be pleasant).
But if there is something else that you can't clone, like quantum state being impossible to clone perfectly, or a soul, then the clone is not you but that's because the assumption of a `perfectly identical clone` is wrong