This sounds a lot like someone has fallen for a subtle confusion of map and territory...
So it doesn't really matter if it's a map or not - it tells you something about the territory.
[1] The completeness of quantum theory for predicting measurement outcomes, https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.4123
[2] On the reality of the quantum state, https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v3
I'd phrase this as: the main assumption is that reality is literally encoded by some sort of objective hidden variables theory.
But a mathematical model != a theoretical model. The very same mathematical model will be compatible with uncountably many theoretical models. (By 'theoretical model' I mean something like 'an interpretation of what the math is representing'.)So you can't read off theoretical structure from mathematical structure. And so you can't read off the structure of the world from mathematical structure.
Occam's razor favours a theoretical model that corresponds more closely to the mathematics, rather than one that adds a bunch of epicycles to arrive at a different interpretation. If you follow your logic then you can never reject geocentrism, because it's possible to create a geocentric model that generates the same predictions as a heliocentric one; nevertheless we would generally say that heliocentrism is "more true" and "more physically real" than geocentrism.
[1] http://scienceblogs.com/developingintelligence/2007/05/14/wh...
I just linked to the first article I found that talked about the subject. And it's interesting that you look for something lazy instead of addressing more serious issues like Newton's model vs Einstien's. Very clearly the (much!) more complex answer is more correct than the simple one. Here's [1] another link discussing the issue and gives 2 examples.
[1] http://neuralnetworksanddeeplearning.com/chap3.html Search for "Occam"
You should give links you're willing to stand by. I didn't go looking for something lazy, I went looking for talk about fundamental physics (where Occam's Razor is appropriate, and what we're talking about) and found only the barely even wrong throwaway line about M-theory.
> Very clearly the (much!) more complex answer is more correct than the simple one.
Newton and Einstein don't make the same predictions. When you include the amount that you'd have to add on to Newton's theory to generate the predictions Einstein gives you about the behaviour of light, Einstein ends up simpler.
> Here's [1] another link discussing the issue and gives 2 examples.
The "new particle" example shows the opposite of what's claimed. Bethe's only reason to dismiss a new particle as an explanation was Occam's razor. The part about Newton/Einstein is just wrong about the history; relativity wasn't developed as an effort to explain the orbit of Mercury, it was developed out of Maxwell and Lorentz's work on electromagnetism. A universe in which the only reason to believe relativity was those deviations in the orbit of Mercury probably would be a universe in which the true theory was Newtonian gravity with small correction terms, not a universe in which relativity was true.
Thank you for pointing out the other fault of Occam's razor: both sides of most arguments tend to assume the razor is on their side. This aspect was addressed in the second article I linked.
In general, it's hard to use Occam's razor in a non-question-begging way.
> ...we're not merely constructing a map, but a model, that is, we try to feel out and understand the territory, what it's made of, and how it works.
'map' is a metaphor there. You're description of what physics is doing still fits within the metaphor. It doesn't change the fact that there is something 'out there' and then there's our description of it, via physics, and our description is not the thing that's out there.
Suppose we develop a unified theory in physics which supersedes current formulations of quantum theory. Then would the old quantum theory still BE the territory at that point? Or would it be just a less accurate description than the new one we came up with?
No, I think that a mathematical expression describes the behavior of something real as close as possible to our knowledge -- it's not just a picture of how it looks.
In other words, in contrast with the map analogy, the equations for electrons etc can be used for a simulation.
>Suppose we develop a unified theory in physics which supersedes current formulations of quantum theory. Then would the old quantum theory still BE the territory at that point? Or would it be just a less accurate description than the new one we came up with?
Why assume one can describe the territory in just a single (perfect) level of representation? For some things not even the full precision we can muster today is even needed (e.g. I don't need Relativity to know where a baseball will land).
To the extent that "is" means anything, yes.
> Suppose we develop a unified theory in physics which supersedes current formulations of quantum theory. Then would the old quantum theory still BE the territory at that point? Or would it be just a less accurate description than the new one we came up with?
I think it's useful to treat "isness" as something analogue rather than binary here. The old theory sort-of-is the territory. The new theory a-bit-more-is the territory. But there's no Platonic ideal of the territory as a separate thing from the mathematical model that reality implements. There is no there there.
That's what they really think of many worlds. And, really, is it any worse than any of the alternatives?
> I think of many worlds as kind of a literal interpretation that quantum superpositions are fundamentally real, as opposed to quantum superpositions merely being a very accurate mathematical model.
If the stance is predicated on that assumption, as you suggest (and I'm inclined to agree, having read other of Carroll's writings), then I have to continue disagreeing. If the rest of the world of physicist luminaries were unanimously aligned with Carroll it would be more difficult (but still tempting...)—but luckily that's not the case.