I have seen people argue for it still working for other forms of property (most notably houses; I don't want to be forced out of my home) with the argument that if people set a value e.g. 2x what the property is worth, that will deter forced selling and then the tax rate can be lowered slightly to be revenue neutral. I'm less convinced.
As a simple means the government could also act as the 'auction house' for properties and entertain prospective bids on a property. The median of those bids could be used to set the asking price if it's higher than the last public valuation of the property (this is mostly to discourage front companies down-bidding to cheat taxes).
For more fungible items the current market valuation seems much more obvious.
Optionally, add a provision that, if the town objects, the owner names a new price for the appraisal that the town can either accept as a valid appraisal or purchase the property for 111% of the owner's figure.
This way, people whose properties have skyrocketed in value relative to the rest of the city would have their taxes go up slightly, those whose values have gone up but gone up by a relatively lower amount would see a reduction in taxes, and the city still gets all its revenue for operations.
If everyone's value has doubled (as an example), it would seem better to raise everyone's assessments by 100% and cut the millage rate by 50% than to have some weird half-Prop13 situation where 123 Main St is assessed at half of 125 Main St because 123 last sold in 1984 and 125 sold last week for $1.4MM in cash.
> Can’t raise taxable values to be realistic, as a lot of older folk are sitting on fixed income in multi-million dollar homes.
In this situation, maybe we should allow retired/older folks to defer taxes until the sale of the property (kind of a government-based reverse mortgage). Would be messy to administer though.
Hah, it's kind of zen - if a house isn't being offered for sale, does it really have a selling-price?
As a hypothetical, you could mandate that people put a value on their house, and then say "you must accept offers more than Nx that price - so say, if N=2 and you value your house at $1million, then if someone offers $2mil, you automatically sell.
Then, charge them tax based on their own evaluation. If they value it way too low for the purposes of tax fraud, then someone will just buy their house for said stupidly-low price and sell it at market-price for a profit.
I mean, there are all sorts of social problems with it (that might well sink it), but it seems like a pretty nifty solution to the problem.