To me is seems that this feature of browsers is really only meant as a protection against non-advanced attackers accessing an unlocked computer. For this scenario, having a stronger hash would do nothing.
Having a stronger hash would mitigate against exfiltration off the device by malware, but if malware can exfiltrate files off your device it's very likely they can e.g. read your passwords from memory, or keylog until the next time you input the password. It would also mitigate against someone being able to dump your password db off your filesystem if they get physical access to your computer, but full disk encryption does that better, and also protects all the rest of your personal data that's stored on the device.
Historically this is why Chrom{e,ium} has been resisting introducing this feature. Its uses are very limited against "real" attackers.
Mozilla spending time on cool tech rather than dumb migrations between password schemes that provide no value seems like a good tradeoff.