90 days is not a standard. Nothing was shortened. People are allowed to publish their research whenever they like. Vendor advance notification is optional.
Full, immediate disclosure is responsible.
90 days is not a standard. Nothing was shortened. People are allowed to publish their research whenever they like. Vendor advance notification is optional.
Full, immediate disclosure is responsible.
Well, fuck 'em, I guess.
Responsible disclosure, contrary to the super-cool leet kid notions expressed by people with who choose to exhibit an underdeveloped social conscience, is not doing a solid for the companies who have vulnerabilities. It's for the users who consume things. Security researchers are effectively taking upon themselves a role of public service. That comes with responsibilities to the public, not to AMD or whoever.
Meanwhile, this crew looks like they briefed the media before telling the vendor, which is all kinds of fucked.
1. All of the relevant people, i.e. "the users downstream of bugs" are already vulnerable.
2. It's possible, maybe even probable (or likely), that people, other than the researchers that are disclosing the vulnerability, have also discovered the same vulnerability and, furthermore, that those others can exploit the vulnerability.
3. Every delay in disclosing the vulnerability prevents the victims from protecting themselves from any bad actors mentioned in [2] thru means more drastic than applying a patch or similar from the relevant vendors (e.g. taking the affected components offline or otherwise making them unavailable).
The argument hinges on the probable size of the bad actors mentioned in [2]. If you assume that the disclosing researchers are the first people to discover the vulnerability, then it would possibly be best for them to first disclose the vulnerability to the relevant vendor or vendors. But note that even vulnerabilities disclosed to vendors can be leaked to bad actors.
And if you don't assume that the disclosing researchers are the first people to discover the vulnerability, then not disclosing ASAP prevents people from protecting themselves.
I think a cursory look at the world indicates that this is not even adjacent to reality.
Some high-value targets (e.g. key infrastructure, parts of government, major enterprises) have dedicated security teams, and can come up with a pretty decent response if given the appropriate information. Divulging vulnerability information widely, in particular, may or may not be a net benefit to them. (Consider e.g. Linux vendor vulnerability lists.)
Other high-value targets (e.g. journalists, human-rights activists, etc.) are utterly outgunned by their adversaries (who can afford to buy or find new vulnerabilities), and can only hope that something causes vendors to consistently write software that's sufficiently-uneconomic to exploit. In the sufficiently-long run, proponents of full disclosure would argue, anything that increases the cost of shipping vulnerable software should help these users.
(Disclaimer: absolutely not speaking for my employer here.)
I agree that some proponents of immediate disclosure would claim that their actions encourage vendors to ship less vulnerable hardware or software. I do not believe that that, in the general case, is why it is being done. And I am certain that that, in this specific case, is not why it was done.
However, overall, I agree with you. Person with exploit needs to compare the probable consequences of disclosing at time N vs. disclosing at time N+1.
If it's being exploited in the wild and users can meaningfully self-protect, disclose now!
If the vendor will probably have a patch in 2 weeks, there is not widespread exploitation of the vulnerability, and disclosing now will cause widespread exploitation, disclose in 2 weeks.
If the vendor seems like they will never issue a patch on their own (because significant time has elapsed), such that at some point in the future there's going to be widespread exploitation and you're only hastening that a bit, go ahead and disclose now.
Hiring a PR firm before disclosing to the vendor is not responsible. Briefing select press before disclosing to the vendor is not responsible.
[1] https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/01/good-newsbad-news-in...
I can go with immediate, or I can go with never. But realize that every vuln is different, and their impact (or hardship of writing or applying patches) may not always be fully understood by stakeholders involved before or immediately after the details are released [CVE-2015-0235].
[CVE-2015-0235] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0235
We could always have the government regulate this instead though, instead of being professionals and self-regulating.
Fortunately for us all the actual exposure is minimal.