Thinking Differently about Thinking: The Mind-Expanding Ideas of Andy Clark
newyorker.com
newyorker.com
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/BeingThere.AClark1998....
The title even seems to be a nod to Heidegger's "dasein" (as well as to Woody Allen).
After I read the series I started thinking about notes and books and references as being a sort of external brain that I shouldn't be ashamed of utilizing if I needed to. Or maybe more like the secondary storage to my brain's RAM (long-term memory) and CPU cache (short-term memory.)
That isn't to say that I would actually recommend reading the Golden Queen. It was cheesy and campy, but it had a couple of neat ideas and a talking bear.
- Psychohistorical Crisis by Donald Kingsbury (plays a major role)
- Accelerando by Charlie Stross (minor role)
- The Peace War, Marooned in Realtime by Vernor Vinge (relatively major roles)
edited for formatting
In general, I find the intermixing of science and philosophy an increasingly common situation for those interested in "the mind." For me, it is hard to reconcile the falsifiable and evidence-based nature of science with the inherently linguistic nature of philosophy. Philosophers have come to this question not due to their knowledge of neurology or psychology, but rather to heap on more theory to the word "mind" itself.
My question is: What is the practical use of this theory of mind? How does it "expand" my mind to be reminded that I use tools and props? Since it is clearly not news that all of us use tools and props, is the author's primary insight to claim that these are part of the mind? How does that claim aid society?
What does it mean to 'me'? What does it mean to be 'you'? What are those differences really? What makes the 'me' of 10 years ago the same or different from the 'me' of this morning? And of the 'me' 20 years from now?
That, to me, is the really interesting question. And Derek Parfit basically answered it.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't see how. If I write about the first house I grew up in, and then forget all about it, can that old notebook recognise the extant building? If I hold the closed notebook in my hand, waft it around a bit, will we recognise the house? For recognition to happen there has to be some matching or prediction of sensory data by memory data. All of which takes place in a fairly small volume and time window, within the brain. Extended body, yes. Extended memory, yes. 'Extended mind', not so much. Not yet.
A notebook is swap space that has to be causally linked to you somehow (through your eyes, etc) to be useful just like a part of your brain has to be linked to you (generally through direct wiring).
In the future, you'd expect a mature theory of mind to give direction to psychologists or neuroscientists. A rough analogy would be the way theoretical physicists interact with experimental physicists and chemists. It's difficult to create the experiment or speculate about a reaction without a point to jump from. In the same way, a psychologist looks to philosophy to ask "what are the most important questions to people, and how might that reflect in how they behave?"
The practical use is elevation of the professional status of Andy Clark, and ultimately to sell articles, books, and public appearances.
Can it be anything else in this world? It is far too nebulous to nail down in any concrete manner, so it's practical application is a money grab, and little more. I bet Andy knows this too, but a philosopher's got to eat, has to promote themselves professionally, and owns an ego too. Why not?
My favorite argument by Andy Clark specifically is his take on the Outfielder Problem: if you study the brain with a "disembodied", action-free theoretical lens, you have a really hard time parsimoniously explaining how an outfielder runs to catch a fly-ball. If you take the "embodied", "action-oriented" view, you see that solving cognitive problems using bodily and environmental resources via continually-updated motor planning is not only the theoretically elegant solution (the one that makes most precise use of the available sensory data, has the fewest parameters, is cheapest to compute), but simply resembles what we observe people actually doing (linear optical acceleration cancellation).
And the tools don't just exist without, your mind is built from tools within as well. There is a part of your mind that rationalizes things, for instance. Rationalization is a tool that other parts of your mind can draw on. I think this is quite clear if you've spent a good amount of time having to argue with your own thoughts, maybe that isn't a very common experience though.
Similarly there's a part of your mind that simulates experiences. It can be used by the part of your mind that makes predictions, and it can be used by the part of your mind that recollects.
Some people's minds use visual or auditory processing components to aid in arithmetic. It's sort of the human equivalent of doing computation on the GPU.
The biggest myth we tell ourselves, on which so much flawed philosophy is based in my opinion, is that we're a single thing. We like to think that what we are is something that is a whole unto itself, that can be isolated, and not, like everything else in the universe, a collection of interactions viewed from a particular perspective.
It's an obvious idea in robotics ("The world is its own model" as Dreyfus put it) but may be less obvious in general reinforcement learning research.
Clearly, we're all just made of atoms. But it's helpful to think about those atoms in an organized way.
It reminds me of the classic chain of abstractions in the sciences. One version:
* Philosophy --> Math
* Math --> Physics
* Physics --> Chemistry
* Chemistry --> Biology
* Biology --> Psychology
* Psychology --> Sociology
Where does this one fall? Maybe * Neurology --> Cogsci
Maybe a specific aspect of psychology or cognitive science. For example, the questions * "What is the role of environment in identity and coping?"
* "What would an artificial mind look like?"
* "How do minds shape their environment?"It seems the distinction still remains between Inga and Otto in other words between the mind in our heads and the mind in our devices because for what’s in our heads we can always choose whether we want to tell others or not but for our devices even if we set our privacy settings we lose control of choice over who to share that information with as soon as we tell the cloud about it
For instance finding out the address of MOMA in the first place may require asking someone or googling it.
The stronger version is that some interesting ideas can only come about by dialogue between specialists.
Sometimes a dilemma for scientists is whether to share and benefit from input but then perhaps give away the key insight to others. Q.v. Wilkes showing Crick Rosalind Franklin's DNA crystallograph.
Proper courtesy, accreditation and citation can in some cases avoid this - yet Wilkes told no-one he was working on Fermat's last theorem for many years until he thought he had a solution.
Pedestrians' minds rely on things like Walk signs and sidewalk texturing.
Pen & Pencil are just environment variables.