I honestly don’t care about the rationale, but this inconsistent behaviour is simply wrong. After 18 years of discussion, end this. Whenever DECRYPTION_FAIL occurs, there MUST be no decrypted content.
I honestly don’t care about the rationale, but this inconsistent behaviour is simply wrong. After 18 years of discussion, end this. Whenever DECRYPTION_FAIL occurs, there MUST be no decrypted content.
Perhaps the moral of this story is to disable GPG's pipe feature? But it's a legitimate and significant performance improvement for authentic messages. You "just" have to remember to check the error code and it's fine/safe.
Perhaps that's just too much to ask. Maybe we just can't have fast streaming decryption because it's too hard for client developers to use safely. But that point of view is at least not obvious.
(On the other hand, what were you planning to do with the piped output in the first place? Probably render it, right? If GPG clients stream unauthenticated bytes into a high-performance HTML renderer, the result will surely be efail.)
Now that we have a vulnerability with a name, I think I can make those warning even scarier. I'll update that manual.
If pipes had the connotation you claim they do, it would never be safe to pipe ciphertext, because the whole goal of modern AEAD cryptography is never to release unauthenticated plaintext to callers.
Clients encrypting whole ISO images should expect that decryption will require a non-default flag. Ideally, GPG would do two-pass decryption, first checking the MDC and then decrypting. Either way, the vast, commanding majority of all messages GPG ever processes --- in fact, that the PGP protocol processes --- should be buffered and checked.
If you have a complaint about how unwieldy this process is, your complaint is with the PGP protocol. The researchers, and cryptographers in general, agree with you.
> If pipes had the connotation you claim they do, it would never be safe to pipe ciphertext, because the whole goal of modern AEAD cryptography is never to release unauthenticated plaintext to callers.
You say that like it's a reductio ad absurdum, but I think that's essentially right; you can't do backpressure with unauthenticated ciphertext. You have to buffer the entire output to be sure that it's safe for further processing.
Thus, if you want to buffer the entire output, don't use a pipe; ask the tool to generate a file, and then read the file only when the process says that the file is done and correct.
(I'd say that's a lot more wieldy than two-pass decryption.)
Based on your other remarks about PGP, (nuke it from orbit) I'm not sure you have any constructive remarks to make on how to improve GPG, but I guess making it two-pass by default (with a --dangerous-single-pass flag) would be an improvement.
For normal size emails, users probably wouldn't notice the performance cost of the second pass, and clients who care about performance at that level can opt into single-pass decryption and just promise to check the error code.
I don't care how you implement it, but any claim that you can't check the MDC in GPG because it's a piped interface is obviously false. GPG can, like any number of Unix utilities, some casually written and some carefully written, simply buffer the data, process it, and write it.
And I think it's clear to everybody (in this thread) that GPG's approach is a dangerous blame-the-user approach to API design, even granting that this dangerous approach offers optimum performance (especially relative to adding an entire second pass).
* GPG should never release unauthenticated plaintext to callers. The exit code is a red herring.
* Nothing about "pipes" prevents them from squelching unauthenticated plaintext.
You could also imagine a two-pass approach where you first verify and then decrypt, but then what about a timing attack where a process would be modifying the encrypted file between the two passes?
It doesn't look so easy to solve this problem -- arguably the right way would be to change the design of the OpenPGP protocol, cf https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/27/streamingencryptio...
OpenPGP needs to change as well, but that doesn't make insecure behavior acceptable in the interim, no matter what Werner Koch thinks.