This is an interesting read. However, the final example is a bit puzzling, because point 6 does not follow from 5, 7 does not follow from 6, and 10 does not follow from the previous points because of the addition "if that preventive..." comes out of nowhere. It would be better to make the missing premises explicit.

On a side note, I'd like to question the usefulness of using the term "reasonable" in contemporary philosophy. The problem is that "reasonable" is an evaluative predicate. In its everyday, non-technical use "being reasonable" certainly also involves conforming to social norms and expectations, which has barely anything to do with the quality of reasoning. Philosophers would be better served to use another term instead of playing with words inventing connections between "reason" and "being reasonable" when those words have deviated so much from each other over the past centuries. In contemporary English, "reasonable" does not primarily/by default mean "based on (good) reasons."

Also worth mentioning is that moral philosophers rarely give satisfying definitions of having a reason vs. there being a reason, there being reason (mass noun reading), reasonable vs. rational, justification, reasoning, and good vs. bad reason. Especially the last point is strange, since we're ultimately only interested in good reasons.

That being said, again, it's a nice and interesting article.