Breaking LTE on Layer Two
alter-attack.net
alter-attack.net
1. the data link layer is not protected, so an attacker can perform a relay attack (forward the encrypted radio packets between the phone and the actual cell tower).
2. from watching the encrypted traffic patterns, it is possible to guess which websites the user is surfing by comparing the traffic fingerprints.
3. the packets are not integrity-protected, so it's possible to change bits of data, if you can guess which packet you have and how it's constructed. This is used to manipulate DNS requests to redirect traffic.
I'm not sure about the significance of #1 and #2. A passive attacker might be able to obtain the same information simply by monitoring the physical layer traffic patterns emitted by the phone. Additionally, mobile operators are typically monitoring their frequencies for abuse, so an active attack might not stay under the radar for long.
Regarding #3, this is a complicated way to achieve what you can do with a fake WiFi hotspot, and gives you control over unencrypted communications, which hopefully is only a very small subset of todays traffic thanks to omnipresent HTTPS.
Could VPN protocols be modified to obfuscate traffic patterns (without adding intolerable latency or extra bandwidth costs)? Eg, rapidly change the MSS or add some padding?
Having two virtual network interfaces, one for high-priority traffic that you want to mask, and one for low-priority traffic that only gets sent as masking data, might be a good way to keep it low in the layer stack.
These and other flaws are probably what Stingrays has been using for a while to intercept LTE communications, for some time now:
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/low-c...
https://www.zdnet.com/article/stingray-security-flaw-cell-ne...
Or that Tor Hidden Service that offered full HLR access to a (presumably compromised) carrier for like $5k/month.
The problem with this kind of security by obscurity is that it gives people a false sense of security and nobody wants to change things. I’d prefer if telco attacks were cheap and accessible to any script kiddies because at the very least the resulting nightmare will draw attention to the problem and proper solutions will be implemented.
It's actually a pretty good illustration of the last-mile problem that plagues DNSSEC.