Cambridge launches UK’s first quantum network
cam.ac.uk
cam.ac.uk
they are unhackable using classical methods. So the hacks would be QM based as well (so DefCon will be like QM physicists symposium). Like something along the lines of entangling with (yet not measuring) the signal and performing "shadow" ("counterfactual quantum communication") read of a that signal (entanglement transitivity/swapping, especially if the read/measurement is done after Alice&Bob had already got satisfied with the integrity of the signal as there are also interesting possibilities with that "entanglement in the future affecting the past". Or like this QM analog of NSA Google fiber splitter https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/156673-the-first-quantum... : the photon 4 would be injected back into the channel and Alice and Bob would never know the difference [between the pair 1,4 and the original pair 1,2] while the photon 3 would go into Eve's pocket ).
Of course there can still be implementation errors or attacks at the endpoints. The strength of the chain is the strength of the weakest link. But the abstract protocol itself is a very strong link.
Quantum mechanics allows for superdense coding, where you get a bit more than one bit per particle, but it's probably not really helpful.
If you could, high speed traders would not bother with microwave links.
Quantum networks are (in theory) impossible to snoop on without detection, so they are useful for distributing cryptographic keys. They might be useful to pass quantum states around between quantum computers if they're reliable enough.
https://www.opengovasia.com/articles/8091-worlds-longest-unh...
The theory is sound and the technology is getting there. The question is really whether there's enough commercial interest. Joe Public doesn't care too much about this level of security, but governments, journalists, intelligence groups, and companies with a lot of intellectual property do.
I predict that there will be some commercial uptake of this tech in 20 or so years time, but I don't think it'll be that exciting in terms of practical application. It's already possible to be confident that the pure algorithm is secure, i.e. communications can't be read without some sort of social engineering, backdoors or the like.
Do you want pre-shared secrets and the expense of a quantum network to, in theory, have infinite security (in theory!), or are you okay with tried and tested RSA which gives you >1000000000 years security at a much cheaper cost, that actually works in practice?
In particular messages (bits) are sent as photons with certain polarisations. The space of possible polarisations is roughly rays through the origin in the plane (ignoring circular polarisation). The only way to observe polarisation is to take two possible polarisations and ask which one the photon is. The answer depends probabilistically on the photon’s state and the polarisations chosen. For example a +45° polarisation when observed in the basis of {0°, 90°} corresponds to 50% chance of 0° and 50% chance of 90°. If a certain polarisation p is sent and then one observes with a basis of p or q, there is a 100% chance of observing state p. When a photon is observed it’s polarisation becomes whatever polarisation was observed (this it can’t be measured twice)
The algorithm used works roughly as:
0. Four polarisations are known in advance, made of two orthogonal bases, (but the four states are together orthogonal or linearly independent) and parties can send any polarisation down some channel[2], and observe any photon they receive with one of the bases, chosen before the photon arrives. A 0-state and 1-state is decided for each basis.
1. Alice produces some random data to send to Bob
2. For each bit she wishes to send, she chooses a basis at random and sends the corresponding 0-state or 1-state
3. For each photon he receives, bob chooses a basis at random and observes the photon, recording his basis choice and whether he got the 0-state or the 1-state.
4. Alice and bob compare notes on the bases they chose over a classical insecure channel. They should have picked the same basis 50% of the time.
5. Bob and Alice keep the bits where the basis matched. In these cases, bob should have perfectly received the data.
6. Some [random I think] subset is compared over the classical channel. Where these don’t match up, the photons must have been observed (potentially eavesdropped). An eavesdropper can get a 75% probability [I think] that they were eavesdropped but not noticed by Bob/Alice as an eavesdropper would have had to pick a basis and could have either got it right and sent on an equivalent photon or got it wrong and had Bob probabilistically get the right bit out.
7. If the error rate is suitably low then Alice and bob assume their data was safely transmitted and the rest of it can be used to make a random key.
Please correct me if I’m wrong on this as I’m not an expert and I’m not sure I’ve understood it correctly.
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_key_distribution
[2] optical fibre is this channel. I don’t really understand the physics of it but I thought reflection (inside the fibre) could cause polarisation to change or just loss of photon. I don’t know this is dealt with but I’d love to find out.