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Comment by dragonwriter | Hacker News Reader

To the extent that discouraging this practice is useful, a tax seems more sensible than a zoning ban; a zoning ban, by effectively grandfathering incumbents, is basically a barrier to new entrants competing (if on-site cafeterias didn't have a business function, firms wouldn't spend money on them) with incumbents (whether for talent, or on productivity if food in-house contributes to that.) A tax can internalize whatever negative externalities are seen from the practice in a manner which neither prohibits use of existing investments nor creates an unfair preference for incumbents.

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The entire point of the law is to extract economic rents for incumbents at the expense of newcomers. It's been the modus operandi for the Bay Area for a long time. Adding a tax to incumbents doesn't do that. Besides which, I doubt that the legislators involved even know what deadweight losses are, let alone why they're an important part of the argument for Pigovian taxes.

> The entire point of the law is to extract economic rents for incumbents at the expense of newcomers.

While I don't (as indicated in my other comments in this thread) disagree with the idea that that is a probable ulterior motive, the overt purpose is to deal with negative externalities imposed by in-office cafeterias. I'm pointing out that, to the extent that the overt purpose is a real issue, there are much better ways to address this.

It's Peskin. Zoning is his weapon of choice.

Instead of quibbling about the choice of means in social engineering, maybe the first question to consider is whether such interference is a legitimate power of government.

It is a legitimate power if the people who form the government consented to give the government the power to write zoning laws. The real question is — when did we consent to be governed by these dopes?

In the US zoning laws are an early-20th-century creation, initially ruled unconstitutional but eventually unleashed by the Supreme Court in 1926 under the cover of police power. [1] However police power was not conceived so broadly at the time the first 13 States consented to the US Constitution (zoning regulation would have been seen as covertly taking one's property without compensation).

As for elections, they are not unusual; the crux is what kind of powers are properly delegated by the electoral body to people in this local/city government? unlimited use of zoning laws for any purpose?

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_of_Euclid_v._Ambler_Re....

Vote in local elections. If you want your voice heard, you have to take the time to speak.

The question “is this a good way of serving the overt goal” is easier to answer without running into clashes of first principles than “is it a proper role of government to internalize externalities”.

It may be the case that “do in office kitchens produce a net negative externality” may be as easy to answer as the first question, but it at least seems to me that the answer is less obvious.

False alternative.

Maybe it is none of the city government's business whether a corporation provides on-premise food to their employees, regardless of what you may imagine consequences might or might not be to the aspirations of other people and corporations.

However, if the standard is "internalize externalities" then anything goes. There would be no limits to interference by local government.

I think you just illustrated my point that it is much easier to answer the question “is the proposed policy a reasonable way of acheiving the stated goal” without running into clashes of moral first principles than it is to answer “is the proposed policy a legitimate function or government”.

Which answers your upthread question about why answer the former question without first addressing the latter question.

> However, if the standard is "internalize externalities"

I'm not saying that is the standard, I am saying that this policy can readily be rejected without even reaching that question.

You're providing a textbook example of pragmatism -- the rejection of principles in the name of arguing about minutiae and acting on the range of the moment, refusing to consider first principles in the name of expediency.

When Trump idiotically threatens tariffs on Canada and Germany, it should not be an opportunity to debate how much, on what products, or if there are easier ways to destroy free trade -- the proper question is: is that a legitimate power of the executive? (hint: it is not)

> You're providing a textbook example of pragmatism

Thank you.

> the rejection of principles

Pragmatism does not in general, or here in particular, involve rejection of principles. It may reject arguing about abstract principles when there is a simpler and less divisive means of addressing an issue.

> When Trump idiotically threatens tariffs on Canada and Germany, it should not be an opportunity to debate how much, on what products, or if there are easier ways to destroy free trade -- the proper question is: is that a legitimate power of the executive? (hint: it is not)

We could argue all day about whether you are right or whether it is, despite not being a legitimate independent power of the executive under the Constitution, nevertheless a statutory power of the Executive under laws duly passed by Congress under unquestioned commerce clause power—this isn't regulating intrastate transactions that might distant impact interstate or foreign trade, but directly regulating foreign trade—and, as such, a legitimate executive power.

Or we could just agree that it's an idiotic counterproductive policy regardless of whether or not it's within the President's legitimate scope of legal power.

Natch.

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