Google Titan Security Key
cloud.google.com
cloud.google.com
It's not so much a problem in a corporate setup (like internally at Google) where you could go to a central admin team to revoke/replace the key.
But if you're a home user using this for a wide variety of sites and the token fails then the failure mode seems to be "go figure out the fallback for every site you use and use that", which could be really painful.
I prefer the, possibly less secure but more flexible option of TOTP applications that let me synch to multiple devices, so the loss of one device isn't very painful.
That’s how those central teams manage to revoke keys easily.
In practice, well, meh...
IIRC OpenID worked like that but unfortunately it never gained traction. It's a shame really.
More practically I do use a yubikey myself but mostly as a GnuPG smartcard, not for 2FA. I actually have the same key stored on multiple tokens as a backup, so if my current key breaks I just have to fetch an other one. Of course if instead I lose it or it's stolen I'll probably have to generate new keys (even though the PIN should theoretically still protect me) so the problem still exists.
Indeed, I was recently locked out of some of my accounts: I used some "one-shot backup codes", but some sites didn't deliver them (and so, required involvment of admin/support by mail+phone).
I'm very surprised when people voice this concern. These keys cost a mere $20 or so. There's no limit to how many website you can set them up with. So $40 or even $60 is all you need to invest in.
This makes having one in a safe location somewhere kind of tricky, as it has to be accessible when you're signing up. so for example if you're travelling/working from another site, you won't have your "safe" key to hand.
Also you need to remember to do the enroll twice for every service, forget one, and you're back to trying to see if there's a fallback procedure.
https://cloudplatform.googleblog.com/2017/08/Titan-in-depth-...
I'm not sure if this is the "hardware security module" they've been touting for Pixel 2 devices, too.
I assume this project was spun-off from Project Vault, or at least they re-used some of the ideas/code from that, but it's still a shame we won't be getting the microSD "HSM" anymore. I guess that idea died when Google and other manufacturers decided to kill support for microSD in their devices altogether.
https://techcrunch.com/2015/05/29/googles-project-vault-is-a...
This is Yubico's response to the Titan Key announcement, if you care to read it:
Why should I trust USA produced products?
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_integrate...
I bet they wish they had stayed open right about now.
The Yubico's cost 50€ the piece or 20€ for the U2F key only. And to get NFC usage you have to buy a worse variant of the other keys that doesn't support 4096bit RSA and some other features.
There is not much competition either, Nitro is just as expensive and doesn't feature a good and cheap key either.
Open Source variants are also fairly rare, I would love to DIY some Yubikey 4-like stick with the same or similar/comparable function set. Only thing so far I found is the U2F zero but that didn't offer RSA.
Quite annoying, maybe some competitor other than Yubikey and Nitro can solve this. (It doesn't seem Google is selling the Titan, I see no pricetag)
If your phone is compromised by someone who can exploit it then your adversarial outlook is pretty dire to begin with.
The mobile phone is more convenient though, and I also don't know how these things work when you try and log in via a mobile device. For high security access though, like google cloud consoles and such, a policy of not allowing access via mobile phones does make sense. (also because said console is probably not very usable on mobile).
You're right however that their key doesn't seem to have any interface other than USB so it won't be practically usable on smartphones. Yubico has NFC tokens[1] for that use case but it doesn't seem that Google's version offers that yet.
Still vulnerable to phishing. If you include a convincing iframe, your attacker can store your TOTP, and use it from their machine.
U2F relies on the domain of the page you are currently browsing, so the code can't be used by another party on the real site.
And if you were thinking about SMS... vulnerable to any attack on the mobile network + phishing + ...
Is it a physical device like in the pictures, or a piece of software? It does not make it clear. I can make a best guess, but from this landing page it is uncertain.
[1] https://www.yubico.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/YubiKey-4-...