I'm not sure you and I are referring to the same thing by "capability". There is no chain of capabilities that needs to be checked, the reference you hold is necessary and sufficient for the operations it authorizes. In existing capability operating systems, this is a purely local operation, requiring only two memory load operations. Hardly expensive.
Every OS is vulnerable to the hardware upon which it runs, but capability security at least makes side channel attacks somewhat more difficult because of least privilege and limiting access to non-deterministic operations, like the clock.
Identity-based security built on an authorization-based model like capabilities also ensures it's difficult to make promises you can't keep. Access list models let you easily claim unenforceable properties and then people are surprised when they are easily violated.
> ease of use asks for maximum resources given to the interactive application, and scheduling based on lowest interactive latency.
That's unnecessary. You need a low latency upper bound, not a "lowest latency". This does not necessarily conflict with throughput, and furthermore, and install requiring high throughput and interactivity rarely overlap.
I'm not even sure what the rest of the properties are supposed to be about. I don't think most of those are mutually exclusive either.