That's not at a useful metric at all.
For example, most of the nationalist/Kemalist leaders were brutal autocrats.
I'd argue that the best among them was Borguiba, but I suppose you've never heard of him.
For example, most of the nationalist/Kemalist leaders were brutal autocrats.
I'd argue that the best among them was Borguiba, but I suppose you've never heard of him.
It was a historical attribute that many "good leaders in the Middle East" shared.
And you specified Middle Eastern, which I took to be exclusive of the Maghreb.
I'm sure there are other examples in North Africa.
But 'name good leaders in the Middle East' -> 'here are some good leaders (many of which were nationalists' -> 'most nationalist leaders were autocrats' isn't arguing the same thing.
I assume we agree that there were in fact many good leaders in the Middle East? Which was my original point.
It's ugly but true.
It also happened in the United States. In Britian. In France. In Germany. In Spain. In Italy. In ancient Greece and Rome.
There are lighter / harsher ways of going about it, though the appropriateness of those is also defined by the opposition's actions.
Successfully creating a national identity, where there were disparate groups before, breaks a lot of people in the transition.
Great, but what does that have to do with my question, exactly? Were Kemalist leaders not nationalist autocrats?
Or are you trying to argue that nationalism is necessary for a country to transition into a democracy?
I'd argue that nationalism is a requisite step for a diverse country, including multiple ethnic or cultural groups within its borders, to become a democracy. (And I'm sure I'm cribbing an old idea in the field here)
It seems like there's little basis for common action without a supergroup which includes, binds, and restrains all otherwise oppositional parties inside a legal framework.
I'd argue that's why uni-party "democracies" tend to be so fragile. When the party becomes the state, then opponents of the party can only be opponents of the state.