A Detailed Look at RFC 8446 (a.k.a. TLS 1.3)
blog.cloudflare.com
blog.cloudflare.com
>This is a big deal, and once TLS 1.3 is widely deployed, the encrypted web is sure to feel much snappier than before.
(If I understand correctly, "This" above refers to 0-RTT.)
Are web clients (such as web browsers, and agents like Cloudflare) using 0-RTT? I thought that 0-RTT was dangerous to use unless you were absolutely sure that your use case would be immune to reply attacks.
In a place like Cloudflare, I could see 0-RTT being acceptable, because the admin configuring Cloudflare for their site would know (and could specify) which paths (like "/") would be safe to use with 0-RTT. But I did not think web browsers could make such an assumption.
Each TLS application (e.g. HTTP) is expected to write up a "profile" if it wants 0RTT which explains how to do it safely. The one for HTTP is currently in draft. The most obvious thing is: truly idempotent operations are safe. GET /favicon.ico looks pretty safe for example. If you log it, and bad guys can cause you to log it more than once, well, OK, but so what?
On the other hand GET /database/delete/yes-really was already a bad idea before 0RTT and there's an arguement that we should not help people shoot themselves in the foot.
Since both sides need to agree to do it, if it turns out that the nice speed up isn't worth the endless feet blown off by it we can expect web browsers to just switch it off.