This is certainly better than losing the investment completely but I can't imagine the investors being too thrilled about this outcome.
Is that not a helpful result?
It's diversification; people investing in these funds are generally NOT looking for similar returns to the public market.
The game is that VCs will adjust, then founders. Then VCs. Then founders ad nauseam forever. This is just one small piece of a giant play being performed by many in different ways every day.
Only very myopic VCs would think this way globally. If every business did this, it would be terrible. But each business is its own opportunity/set of circumstances, and forcing everyone to 10X+ is as equally stupid as cashing out $1MM on a four year term sheet on $2.5MM invested.
You must evaluate each opportunity individually to maximize profit and growth. The intentions can always be to shoot for hypergrowth, but if the probability drops below the profitability point, you shouldn't be forcing the issue. Terrible investors do this, and it happens fairly regularly, though it's slowing down as founders become a bit more intelligent with their options.
Might this be a (converse version of a) No True Scotsman fallacy?
Elsewhere in the thread, a comment [1] referenced an article [2] that details the return imperatives that VCs face. In particular, it details how small returns "don't move the needle".
OTOH, the article asserts that only 5% of VCs (misleading, if a percentage of number of firms instead of AUM) succeed in meeting this imperative, so I wonder how the other 95% still attract enough LP money.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17872045
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17874278 https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/01/the-meeting-that-showed-me...
You never want small returns. But when you can choose a small return over basically a near-zero chance of losing all your money, it isn't that difficult of a choice - or it shouldn't be.
Given their economics, VCs have a very strong incentive (or an imperative, according to that article) for "forcing everyone to 10X+" (and I would argue it's more like 20x+), no matter how small the likelihood of that outcome. Without at least one outsized exit, they're a failure.
Put another way, their LPs aren't paying them to, in any way, play it safe. Near-zero chance isn't the same as zero.
So, yes, the choice for a typical VC isn't difficult. It's just the opposite of what you're proposing.
Anything which involves rent is by far not risk free. Very cycle driven, heavy on litigation and management has to be perfect to make returns.
Also I said “almost risk free”. :)
1.5x is sometimes "good enough" but it won't keep a VC afloat if all of its investments go like that. Even 2x means that you only get to invest twice and fail once. And forget about profits or a living wage.
the math is pretty crazy... even $50m and $100m exits would doom a fund.
In 2014 their ARR was $4.6M so investors probably expected their revenue to follow the $4.6M -> $13.8M -> $41.4M -> $82.8M -> $165.6M trajectory. Buffer's current ARR is $15M, which although is pretty good, is not enough for it to work well with the VC model.
Buffer seems like a fairly successful startup relative to the average. A roughly 8% return per annum is not a good return for a VC given that many of their investments in a given round will go to zero.
There may be reasons for this going the way it did, but I doubt VCs would be all that happy with this.
If it doesn't have that, then taking buffer's money doesn't move the needle much.