Voters strictly can't take a record of their receipt; this opens up a whole other level of voter intimidation, where, if you voted for the wrong person you lose your job, lose benefits, get beat up, get killed.
The "receipt" was a perforated piece of paper with a barcode. The votes were cast by connecting lines, and the right half of that line crossed the perforation lines, and was mine to keep. This seemed like a reasonable system, and I could then verify that my vote was counted.
As for voter intimidation, if we really believe that our democracy is worth killing and dying for in foreign wars, then it would logically follow that we must accept the risk of demanding accountability domestically.
Ideally, assuming you would be voting with a key linked to your identity (SIN), both the IDs of voters and their votes could be entirely public and on your receipt.
The act of counting votes would be for a set of parties to be work with only the public list and given the private key(s) to generate results. The trust there should be similar to counting paper ballots, especially if independent parties combine subsets and arrive at the same result.
> Ideally, assuming you would be voting with a key linked to your identity (SIN), both the IDs of voters and their votes could be entirely public and on your receipt.
What piece of your identity does your employer not have access to? In the U.S. they've typically seen your id, your passport, your pay stubs, your health insurance.