Most browsers stopped even looking at CN or only do so for people's crappy home grown private CAs
Anyway, what makes certs trustworthy isn't the CN, it's a chain of two or more digital signatures leading to a trusted root. And the CN in that root, while it had to be truthful when written, may be twenty years old, so it's nonsense now.
But I wasn't talking about leaf certificates, I expressly mentioned this for the CN in _root_ certificates and it's pretty common for those to have a lifetime of ten, fifteen even twenty five years.
Here's an easy to remember example, https://crt.sh/?id=1 the first entry in the crt.sh database.
The Common Name on that certificate is "AddTrust External CA Root". So... who are AddTrust? I actually have no idea. This root is today controlled by Comodo, a CA in the United Kingdom but you'd never guess that from the certificate.
If you're dumb enough to install one of these boxes on your network, you might also be dumb enough to install an attacker-provided root certificate on your PC.
Is it to circumvent antivirus?