Why not? That's how it was done for email. SPF doesn't prevent interoperability for sending domains that don't use it or recipients that don't verify it. What it does is inhibit forged messages from a domain that does use it to a recipient that does verify it.
Then the more senders who have an SPF record, the stronger a spam signal it is for a domain to not have one, and the stronger the incentive gets for senders to use it. It's already in the recipient's interest to verify it when it's used.
They could even use DNS for this exactly like email. Create a lookup zone equivalent to in-addr.arpa but for phone numbers.
It is not as simple as getting everyone who runs public facing smtpd on the Internet to upgrade their software and practices. Telco and PSTN phone stuff is the very opposite of being up to date and continually evolving best practices for security.
You may not even have to upgrade the old equipment. For an out of band protocol, the upstream may be able to implement it for you.
Turning those companies into smoking holes in the ground doesn't require anyone to upgrade their equipment. All it takes is willingness on the part of lawmakers and regulators to track them down and make them regret their business practices.
Creative use of firewall rules can be really powerful. For a very simple example: block VoIP from AWS's address ranges (serious gain).
A classic response for anon calls in telephony is to make the caller record a short identifying message and then play that to the potential recipient. The potential recipient then decides whether or not to accept the call - your staff (family, whatever) become the firewall. Remember that calls are billed to the caller by the terminating provider so this is OK (caller pays).
Those are two simple examples of using IP and humans to firewall telephony. Just because telephony is a bit crap on the identification side does not mean that you can't deploy lots of other weaponry to keep yourself safe. If you look deeply into SIP and IAX2, you get loads more options as well.