In practice, this looks very much like X509 certificate chains, if you’re familiar with those. The intention is to authenticate all data in the DNS graph with the root zones being signed by a root key, and then every sub-zone signing itself and all other sub-zones until you reach the leaf records signed by the current zones DNSKEY.
Many people take issue with the fact that the root key is a single, long-lived, somewhat weak RSA key, that could be compromised. The general argument is that X509 with TLS is enough authentication of a site one is connecting to, and therefor DNSSEC being somewhat weak, is something unnecessary.
It seems to me, that we would be in a better place with additional explicit trust on TLD providers, eventually leading towards not needing to trust external CAs.
If at the end of the day, the TLD controls everything, I'd rather not have anybody else to worry about.
Nobody has admitted to doing this at the TLD level, most of those people take their jobs too seriously to mess with some nobody, but it has been done down at eTLD+1 several times, and of course it's effective. So yes, there is every reason to expect that this could be done by a TLD registry operator.
What about other records? MX, TXT, NS? How they are protected from tampering, both in transit and by rogue DNS servers?
> weak RSA key
Better than plaintext, harder to modify, is it not?
DNSCrypt, DNS over TLS, DNS over HTTPS.
> and by rogue DNS servers
By querying multiple DNSCrypt servers and comparing the results.
> Better than plaintext, is it not?
Depends. People are going to assume "I am using DNSSEC so I cannot be vulnerable to DNS poisoning."
Checking crypto signature is more reliable, imho
I think best way to go is both, DNSSEC and DoT.
> People are going to assume "I am using DNSSEC so I cannot be vulnerable to DNS poisoning."
I'm one of those suckers :D
Those technologies authenticate the DNS servers, and encrypt the channels, but they do not authenticate the records.
We should have techniques for both privacy, DNSCrypt/DoT/DoH, and authenticity, DNSSEC. I won’t offer an opinion on the root key management in DNS, but the underlying technologies for authenticating and signing records in DNSSEC are good.
Shouldn’t we harden that, and allow it to be used independently of requiring systems to connect to some other centralized system over HTTPS?
Try a thought experiment: imagine the root DNSSEC keys are published to Pastebin tonight. What happens? What blows up? I think, apart from DNS operators (maybe?), you'll have trouble identifying a company who would have to do anything.
2048-bit RSA is “weak”? If I understand things correctly, 2048-bit keys are considered safe for more than ten years still, and the design of DNSSEC is such that the root keys can be rolled over at any time, so when the time comes, the key can simply be substitued for a stronger one.
And the comparison with X.509 is unsuitable. The DNSSEC root key could be compromised? How about the fact that if any CA loses its key, the entire X.509 system is vulnerable until that key can be revoked by every single end user?
How about the fact that CA keys can be revoked? Google and Mozilla killed one of the largest CAs in the market for misissuance. How do you kill .COM? You think if Symantec had a say in the matter, they'd let Google kill their CA business? How about the fact that weeks after the KSK roll, more than half the Internet still depends on the old root key?
You’re moving the goalposts. The parent comment was explicitly about the root key. Yes, there are still weak keys below the root, just as there are still weak certifikates with MD5 hashes out there, but that is neither here nor there.
That's not really "moving the goalpost", so much as "a conversation involving more than 2 people".
I pulled up the chain for cloudflare.com on the grounds that they'd care more than the average site about DNSSEC, and here was the result: http://dnsviz.net/d/cloudflare.com/dnssec/
So that's a 2048 bit root, and then as the chain passes through .com there's a 1024 bit RSA key, and then they have ECC keys for their zone. If their TLS cert had a hop in the chain that used MD5 hashes, Chrome would be refusing to trust their site.
Secondly, as I understand it, a 1024-bit RSA key, while not recommended, is still vastly more secure than an MD5 hash.
The perfect is the enemy of the good. What is the intended result of advocating for choosing not to adopt DNSSEC? Is this intended result actually likely, or is it more like a boycott for the principle of the thing?
On the second: MD5 is one example, but the browser blacklists SHA1 as well. It also blacklists CAs that behaved poorly in the past, and refuses to use vulnerable ciphers.
Because this is the first time they ever switched the root key, and they want to observe the effects a bit more first? My prediction assumes that it works and sufficient time will pass. Also, ECC keys are not yet as widely supported by resolvers as RSA keys are. This, too, will require experimentations and time for conversion to be viable.
Meanwhile: nobody relies on DNSSEC today. I'm not kidding when I say the root keys could land on Pastebin tonight and almost nobody would have to work late or even get paged.
Doesn't it seem just sort of plainly obvious that we should drop a flag on the broken protocol we're looking at now and re-do it properly with modern cryptography?
What makes you think that people will support this hypothetical new protocol faster than adding support for good crypto types in DNSSEC?
I mean, is that really what you are suggesting as the proper course of action? Throw away DNSSEC and have nothing replacing it until a new protocol is standardized and implemented as widely?
Yes: we should throw away DNSSEC and have nothing replace it until something better is available. Nobody relies on DNSSEC today! I feel like that point just isn't sinking in with you. Take some time and consider its impact. 25+ years after the work started: nobody relies on DNSSEC at all. DNSSEC simply does not matter right now. That's not hyperbole; it's a statement of fact.
“weak” was about half of your original argument:
> The general argument is that X509 with TLS is enough authentication of a site one is connecting to, and therefor DNSSEC being somewhat weak, is something unnecessary.
If we discount “weak”, let me then reply to the remainder of it:
Firstly, DNSSEC is not only for web traffic, DNSSEC secures DNS for everything which uses domain names to locate services, not only HTTP. This is a big deal not only for more obscure (not to mention future) protocols, but also for sending e-mail, the MX lookup phase of which is otherwise unsecured.
Secondly, the general problem with X.509 with rogue CA’s remain, and the only counter I have seen is akin to “but we can close those barn doors really well after each individual horses escape”, and I remain unconvinced.
Thirdly, how do you prove you own a domain enough to get a X.509 certificate? You answer DNS requests, which is spoofable unless secured by DNSSEC.
The SMTP-STS standard is explicit that it is motivated by the desire not to rely on DNSSEC.
The other major use case for DNSSEC is, as you suggest, protecting DV verification. But in the long term, DNS is going to get factored out of domain verification entirely. CAs will eventually (who knows how long it will take, even though the protocols are there) just verify domains directly with registrars using something built on RDAP. In the meantime, there are countermeasures against DNS spoofing (that have the virtue of also working against BGP spoofing, which DNSSEC doesn't fix) that the CAs can (and gradually do) deploy.
It's hard to see the justification for rolling out an expensive, inferior protocol to mitigate attacks that we're already adequately mitigating today and will in the future decisively address through other means.
> But in the long term, DNS is going to get factored out of domain verification entirely. CAs will eventually (who knows how long it will take, even though the protocols are there) just verify domains directly with registrars using something built on RDAP.
Get back to me when that actually happens, or looks likely to ever happen. Last I heard, the proposed replacement of WHOIS with RDAP has been put on very thick ice, and it is uncertain what will actually happen.
> It's hard to see the justification for rolling out [DNSSEC] (…)
In my world, that ship has long sailed. DNSSEC is fully rolled out. I work for a domain name registrar, and more than 30% of all the domains we manage are DNSSEC signed, and we could easily sign another 30% if we wanted to.
DNSSEC has long been rolled out. It’s too late to argue that it shouldn’t be.
People affiliated with registrars are constantly pointing out how many zones they sign, as if that was any kind of argument at all. Look, nobody doubts that you can build a feature into your stack that automatically signs zones. 30%? Why not 100%? Who cares? That's just theater. What matters are companies actually relying on the protocol. Nobody does, today.
I only mentioned X509 as people are going to be more familiar with that than DNSSEC. The reason I mentioned it was to describe it as having a comparable method for validating the chain of certificates/signatures. It is very similar in that regard to X509 certificate chains.
I’ve implemented DNSSEC in my own project, so I know the protocol, and I do agree that for MX records, as well as TXT and other record types that we need to validate that the records are authentic, in many contexts. Not just web and not just public internet, where we might want to pin custom trust anchors.
I can see you are very concerned about this as am I, and if you want to reach out and discuss this in a different forum, I’d be happy to, as I think we have shared interests in seeing this succeed.
I argued against the argument which you presented in a summarized form, nothing more.
The most practical concern right now is that DNSSEC isn't even being honored by most clients, so even if you build a solution that you're comfortable with, it will be doing nothing to secure most of your customers' connections. If clients start using DNSSEC more in the future, you'll hear about it.