You look at the roulette board. You bet on red.
We rewind time.
You still bet on red. The state is identical.
Did _you_ come up with that decision? Of course you did, who else could have?
My claim is not that there's no "you".
It's that "free will" is meaningless unless we use a weird interpretation of terminology.
If you'd do the same thing every time, there's no 'freedom'.
If you do different things, but it's based on some sort of tiebreaker RNG, there's no 'will'.
Note that there could be random elements in my mental makeup. i.e. my mental state might include input from an RNG, but it's still part of me and as long as it's not the only input into any of my choices, we can still talk about responsibility.
See my comment about No Country for old Men on choosing to use randomness.
The point you seem to be making:
A) If I make the same choice everytime there is no free will.
B) If I make different choices everytime there is no free will? Or perhaps even there is no "me"?
Free will could entail the will to choose the same thing every time AND the will to choose something different.
If we can't accept that then perhaps an argument could be made that there is no such thing as "you".
From the paper:
Some readers may object to our use of the term “free will” to describe the indeterminism of particle responses. Our provocative ascription of free will to elementary particles is deliberate, since our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed, it is natural to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of our own.