Cool. HSMs are a notable step up from secure execution environments like TrustZone and SGX because they make side-channel attacks that take advantage of the shared hardware much more difficult.

That said, the HSM itself becomes a target after a while. So the more stuff you off-load to your enclave, the larger the attack surface becomes, and now you moved your problem over.

And I am further skeptical about how much this improves on the status quo. Apple delivered a secure enclave that was essentially a blackbox. Google delivered one and is open sourcing the firmware at some point (apparently.) Now, this is going to give us an enclave with open source hardware. But in a world where there are known, novel attacks against the integrity of microchips that would make it difficult to verify even in the presence of microscope images of a decapped chip, I'm not sure if this really gives us that much reassurance that the chip does what it says. And if it did, we would never know for sure that it is free of security-sensitive bugs.

I still think this is great. Again, step above SGX and TrustZone in my opinion. But, this article makes it sound like a panacea, which I don't think is the case.

(Case in point: people have successfully attacked devices secured with enclaves, including iPhones and I assume Pixel. Doesn't matter how bad ass your gate is if it isn't surrounded by an equally strong fence. These devices should keep encryption secrets secure, but they don't 'stop hackers.')