I don't see how what you've said is anything other than the criterion of formal consistency - that a thing and its negation are not both provable. And a system may certainly be consistent, yet not particularly useful.
It should be noted that mathematics has not always been as rigorous as people assume. Attempts to ground math in formal logic didn't really get off the ground until the late 1800s. And this isn't a trivial point; the "rules of the game" were up for debate, and often debated, before then (and, to a lesser extent, since). People disagreed about which numbers exist; people disagree about which proof methods are acceptable; and for example, calculus - a highly practical branch of mathematics - was invented before its formal justifications were found.
[If a counterexample to Fermat's last theorem is found it probably isn't because ZFC is inconsistent, but because Wiles' proof has a mistake, which would show that the checking of the proof was inadequate and that mathematics needs to use a higher standard for what is considered a valid proof. So the system of proof is falsifiable in a very broad sense: it can expose a bad proof checking culture within mathematics as well as inconsistencies in the formal system. I don't think that metaphysics has anything equivalent. If somebody comes up with a counterexample a,b,c,n then Wiles would immediately admit that his proof has a mistake, even though he wouldn't even know where in the proof the mistake is. Try convincing a metaphysicist that their argument is wrong or meaningless... That said, there are certainly also stubborn mathematicians who insist that their proof is right even though other mathematicians have pointed out that a particular step isn't clear. However, if the mathematician who came up with the proof cannot clarify that step, ultimately down to the axioms of ZFC, then the proof isn't accepted.]
This follows from consistency (and is one reason why consistency is important). If there were some whole number solution to a^n+b^n=c^n for n>2, then this would be provable in Peano Arithmetic (a much simpler system than ZFC, that axiomatizes natural number arithmetic). ZFC extends PA (every theorem of PA is a theorem of ZFC, interpreted correctly; this is relatively easy to show); thus, anything ZFC proves is not falsifiable in PA, otherwise we'd have a contradiction provable in ZFC (& it wouldn't be consistent).
Contrast this with a discipline in which there is jargon and arguments about that jargon. It might be the case that the jargon and the basic ways of arguing about the jargon forms a consistent system in some sense, even though the whole enterprise is meaningless.