To be honest, and with all due respect, avoiding JWT outright feels a lot like a cargo cult to me. I have yet to see a solid argument against JWT itself, aside from the criticisms you just gave of "it doesn't minimize the set of things that can go wrong." In reality, that statement is like saying "x509 doesn't minimize the set of things that can go wrong."
The criticism is leveled at JWT as if the JWT spec attempts to be anything but "a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties," to quote the spec. I think JWT is better understood as what it intends to be, a simple standard for easily-understood claim sets, that more finely detailed, granular, and secure standards can be built atop.
Admittedly, I'm reading about macaroons for the first time, but from what I can tell they're a higher level concern than something like a JWT. I'm not sure I would actually try it, because it wouldn't be very efficient, but I'd wager you could implement macaroons securely, using JWT as the container for the claims (including claimed constraints) and HMAC signatures.
Maybe I'm totally off base, and if so I'd love to take the time to understand how, but I don't see how JWT as the tiny spec it is, or JWS/JWE, again rather small specs, have done anything to maximize what can go wrong, as much as they are deliberately reducing their surface area to be composable, and to allow other standards to compose them into more secure, minimally faulty specs.