And in their FAQ you can find you can use phone number if you want, exactly for described purposes.
But as someone who was living in country where you can't trust your government, I can't trust messengers where phone number is a requirement.
And in their FAQ you can find you can use phone number if you want, exactly for described purposes.
But as someone who was living in country where you can't trust your government, I can't trust messengers where phone number is a requirement.
https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059792-Re...
If the existing user is still logged in to the Signal account with the old number, you're effectively locked out. Otherwise, you'll be able to claim the number after a week.
You don’t get to know who the previous person was messaging, see their contact list or have access to any of their messages. But if they message you thinking it’s still the previous person and ignore the ‘safety number’ warning, you could potentially impersonate them.
which apps detect that case and give a safety warning?
The last section of that post specifically talks about the notification shown after a reinstall (i.e., safety number change)
also interesting what they write about the perception of finger-prints. i agree with their assessment and conclusion that using the term finger-print may confuse people because they think finger-prints should be secret. but i feel that the real problem is the public perception of what a finger-print is. we are leaving finger-prints all over the place, to they are something very very public, and not at all secret, and this the analogy of a crypto-finger-print and a real finger-print is much better than what public opinion would have us believe.
In saying that, the previous behaviour can be restored (for you) but you can't force it onto users who are communicating with you.
assuming that she ignores the change, the failure would be noticed when bob sends another message to alice as now the finger-print would change back to bobs, marking teds as coming from a different identity. this would be detectable in the client.
unclear is how did ted get into bobs account? if bob changed the phone number. i am assuming that shouldn't even be possible, so i believe we can in fact ignore this threat.
it looks differen't though if bob can not reactivate his old account, in which case alice will connect to bobs new account, and hopefully disconnect the old one.
if ted gets the number and reactivates bobs old account then if alice did disconnect, she would notice a reconnect attempt from a new id and treat it like any new connect. if the connect verification doesn't involve the senders phone number then having bobs old number doesn't give ted any advantage.
if alice did not disconnect the old account, she will notice the account being reactivated, and now have two bobs talking to her, raising suspicion.
so it appears the only threat is coming from the case where bob looses his number and does not reconnect to alice with a new number. so alice is unaware that bob changed his number.
this can happen if bob and alice communicate rarely...
About practice - one of Telegram users was comprised using his phone number, because russian government just ordered to mobile operator to do this. It was much more simple than copying sim card :)
Or is there a way to copy SIM card remotely???
As for state-level adversary, I get it. I'm even less concerned here :)
This is already "practical" if you have a capable enough adversary; for example, there have been reports of attackers subverting SMS-based 2FA.
https://www.google.com/search?q=attacks+on+sms+2fa
This could be based on cooperation of the carrier, or perhaps SS7 attacks, or IMSI catchers.
For the past couple years here in the US, scammers have been calling with stolen numbers that match your prefix more than a random caller probably would. So for ABC-DEF-GHIJ all of ABC-DEF matching is a pretty good sign it's a spammer if you live in a large metropolitan area. Unfortunately it makes them nearly impossible to track back, because when you call the number back, it's some random private number that didn't even make the call and has no idea what you're talking about. I've had a couple very angry people call me and yell to stop trying to sell them credit cards.
> That doesn't affect 2FA
You can use the same techniques to say "I am 555-111-2222, route all sms for that number to me".
> that won't show up as "me" on my friends' phone screens when they call
They absolutely can do that.
It's not that they bought numbers in each of the prefixes, it's that they're forging the signaling information for another number in your prefix dynamically, based on your number.
https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6249_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271...
https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6122_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271...