Isn't that a little hard if the verification keys(from that link) are served over HTTP[1][2]?
[1] http://releases.ubuntu.com/18.04/SHA256SUMS.gpg
[2] http://releases.ubuntu.com/?_ga=2.21478331.1690774166.154812...
Isn't that a little hard if the verification keys(from that link) are served over HTTP[1][2]?
[1] http://releases.ubuntu.com/18.04/SHA256SUMS.gpg
[2] http://releases.ubuntu.com/?_ga=2.21478331.1690774166.154812...
As another poster noted the keyserver in that link will work over http so you're still susceptible to a possible downgrade attack.
Given how easy it is to get a LE cert these days it's making me question what other security decision Ubuntu is making that I'm not aware of or have the expertise to evaluate.
With regards to LE certs, I discussed elsewhere here the problems faced by the apt developers that make the obvious "just install a LE cert!" answer not actually workable for them - they rely heavily of volunteer run mirrors and local proxies. I don't know what Ubuntu's ISO download "server" really is underneath, it's possible they've got similar problems, where either they pay for all the bandwidth themselves, or they let people assume that an ssl secured connection to "ubuntu-mirror.usyd.edu.au" or "ubuntu-mirror.evilhacker.ru" is for some reason "safer" than an http connection...
keyserver.ubuntu.com is available over http as well as https, which means it's probably susceptible to a downgrade attack if you're mitming it - which would let you serve a bogus public key and therefore generate apparently valid signatures for the hash for a modified ISO.
That's not good...