>That only helps if you assume the laptop is fully powered off when it is stolen. If it's on or merely in "sleep" mode, disk encryption doesn't help.
Is this true for Filevault? I know a lot of Mac owners who assume otherwise.
Is this true for Filevault? I know a lot of Mac owners who assume otherwise.
It's not just Mac users, I mentioned this issue in a meeting with an Apple sales engineer last month and he acted like you don't need to turn off a Mac to make it safer (he's not a security engineer so I don't really expect him to know how un/safe a running system with FileVault is). It may well be that the current OS and/or T2 chip makes it very, very hard to access the boot volume of a running Mac without a user's login but there's still a network exploit risk.
DMA access does sound plausible, but how can someone run a remote network traffic attack?
(I personally turned off any "smart wake" type of functionality)