dnscurve and dnscrypt are in the same space as DNS-over-HTTPS, DoH, and DNS-over-TLS, DoT. What they do is authenticate the dns server (resolver) and also encrypt the channel giving you privacy.
DNSSEC == authenticated records. dnscurve, dnscrypt, DoH, and DoT == authenticated and encrypted resolutions.
But notice that authenticated resolutions get you authenticated records provided you do them all the way to the root. The root servers on down could support DNSCurve or similar and you could operate recursively using it, or have your trusted recursive resolver do so as you in turn reach it using the same mechanism.
Meanwhile that wouldn't break the cases where you want your DNS server to modify records, e.g. for blocking tracking domains.
The recursive resolver could then provide a different response to the client, but the client could use DNSCurve to authenticate its DNS server as well, so the client only gets malicious responses if it configures a malicious DNS server.
And that would compromise anything. What happens to DNSSEC if the attacker replaces the client's DNSSEC root keys with the attacker's?
With DNSSEC the DNS Server also has to advertise different keys, which is something you can notice in your resolver and alert too, for example if you already know the key is different via a side channel or you communicate with another resolver and they got a different key.
DNSSEC makes such manipulation obvious and also prevents in-transit tampering. Coupled with DoH/T you get all the benefits of both.
Sure there is. You do the recursion yourself and compare the result. If you do this 100% of the time, i.e. run your own recursive resolver, there is no need to even have a third party recursive DNS server that could potentially send malicious responses. If you do it a lower percentage of the time at random, or for specific queries you're expecting interference with, you detect the interference and know not to trust that DNS server anymore.
Comparing keys in DNSSEC is no better than this. If a MITM attacker has altered your root keys, the attacker can forge responses from any DNS server you use, unless you're using something that actually authenticates the recursive resolver (whether DoT/DoH or DNSCurve), at which point you can compare the query responses again and no longer need to compare the keys or use DNSSEC at all.
> DNSSEC makes such manipulation obvious and also prevents in-transit tampering.
Which is one of its flaws. Sometimes you want friendly in-transit tampering. With DNSSEC there is a fixed root of trust that everybody has to follow and nobody can choose for themselves or alter for a specific subset of the tree.
I was talking about during recursion. Plus this is what I mentioned in my previous comment. This is about someone injecting responses on the network level and blocking proper communication or even having taken over an IP via BGP hijack, in which case the NS record might point to the correct IP but a malicious DNS server would be responding.
DNSSEC would detect this failure mode.
>Sometimes you want friendly in-transit tampering
In which case you likely have your own PKI to manage HTTPS MitM as well, so it shouldn't be an issue to run DNSSEC.
So would DNSCurve.
If the root servers were using DNSCurve then you would distribute their public keys in the same way that you distribute their IP addresses, over some secure side channel such as your operating system's software update mechanism.
Once you have the public keys of the root servers, no one can impersonate the root servers to you without their private keys. The root servers can then securely give you the names of the gTLD nameservers. If they use DNSCurve, their public keys are encoded in the names of the nameservers and you can communicate securely with them as well, and so on down the chain.
Hijacking BGP doesn't allow you to impersonate any of the authoritative servers that have a chain up to the root using DNSCurve without having their private keys. You can also pin the public keys of any nameservers that don't have a chain up to the root for the same benefit for that subtree, e.g. if some gTLDs used DNSCurve but the root didn't, or to use between your clients and your company's authoritative DNS servers for your own domain.
> In which case you likely have your own PKI to manage HTTPS MitM as well, so it shouldn't be an issue to run DNSSEC.
This is regularly not the case. For example, sysadmins regularly map the most common tracking domains to a black hole in the resolver on the local network or local machine without doing any kind of HTTPS MitM.
This behaviour doesn't break under DNSSEC; the blackholed domain either blackholes or the resolver fails due to the bad signature and effectively blackholes as well.
>If the root servers were using DNSCurve then you would distribute their public keys in the same way that you distribute their IP addresses, over some secure side channel such as your operating system's software update mechanism. [...]
And what does that gain you over DNSSEC+DoT/H other than being non-standard?
If you give an address that always sends back ICMP unreachable messages, the client fails immediately and continues to load the rest of the page, but DNSSEC proscribes that.
You could refuse to send a response for those names, but then the client has to wait for the timeout. You could send a response with an invalid signature, but then the client should discard it and continue to wait for a valid response, and you still have to wait for the timeout.
There are also circumstances where you want to return a specific address, e.g. so that attempts to send traffic to that address can be monitored, and redirecting the address doesn't work because it could be a shared host using SNI and you don't want to affect every name pointing to that address.
> And what does that gain you over DNSSEC+DoT/H other than being non-standard?
It's simpler, more efficient, lower latency, has less attack surface and can't be used as a DDoS amplification vector.
And if you want something standard, why not standardize on DNSCurve? Using DNSSEC over that is only the sunk cost fallacy.
How would a TLS-using protocol be used as a DDoS amplification vector?
>If you give an address that always sends back ICMP unreachable messages, the client fails immediately and continues to load the rest of the page, but DNSSEC proscribes that.
You can return resolver errors or no data, there is plenty of options for DNS blackholing.
>There are also circumstances where you want to return a specific address, e.g. so that attempts to send traffic to that address can be monitored, and redirecting the address doesn't work because it could be a shared host using SNI and you don't want to affect every name pointing to that address.
You'll need a PKI for that anyway so you can deploy DNSSEC root keys.
Turning off UDP DNS would break everything that still uses it but adding the DNSSEC records makes the UDP responses a DDoS amplification vector even if some clients use TLS.
> You can return resolver errors or no data, there is plenty of options for DNS blackholing.
DNSSEC validates NODATA responses and clients can respond to resolver errors in various ways that amount to more timeouts.
> You'll need a PKI for that anyway so you can deploy DNSSEC root keys.
That's assuming you want to MitM the connection rather than merely log the attempt before dropping it or record it for traffic analysis even if you can't MitM it.
In the DNSSEC case, yes, that's akin to the same thing.
In the other, PGP is both encrypting and authenticating the data, then sending that over untrusted email servers. DoH, DoT, et al, are encrypting the channel, and authenticating the endpoints, but not authenticating the data.