You're asking me to prove a negative. I merely said I doubted you knew about receipt freeness because you didn't even mention it as an obvious counterpoint to your claim, which is a reasonable conclusion. If you consider that an “extremely aggressive attack”, fine. It is easy for you to prove me wrong, you just have to point out the comment in question.
In the meantime, I'll continue to assume you either had no idea what receipt freeness was, or deliberately created the false impression that a verifiable voting system cannot be receipt free.
> I wasn't about to go 10 rounds of "but you could do X and then be broken by Y".
You've failed to show that receipt freeness introduces something else that fundamentally "breaks" which wasn't in the original system, despite repeatedly claiming this is so (see also "They fix this issue and introduce others", a claim made with absolutely zero evidence).
> So here's how I attack it if I'm just a skilled hacker working alone:
So you just assume you can achieve all of this for any e-voting system. Fantastic argument. Really convincing. You may as well have said "Here's how I would attack and infiltrate banking networks or current voting systems surreptitiously. See, we can never trust either of these!" That's just laughable.
> At the end there's a very high chance your election is now fully distrusted and the country is in chaos. Even if it doesn't work 100% of the time it only takes one or two successful events globally for people to distrust these systems, whichever they are.
Clearly wrong as evinced by Estonia's voting system, even in the face of its demonstrated security flaws.
> The scary thing about what I just described is that plenty of it is indistinguishable from what is already happening in some cases in US elections today.
...and it hasn't led to the collapse of the voting system.
> If there are no advantages why do it?
Are you asking what the advantages of e-voting are?
> The difference for eCommerce and eBanking is that under any of those attack scenarios you just go to the bank branch and sort things out, including reverting transactions.
You're assuming banks are always aware of attacks, which is just not true.
> At this point it's on you.
It's not "on me". It's been mathematically proven that a system can possess these properties simultaneously. For example, see
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_...