(Boeing would sell you a third AoA sensor and the AoA Disagree readout as an optional upgrade though! So it's not like they didn't think about it, they just didn't care enough to include it in the base spec.)
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/inves...
Then Boeing supplied a flight manual that a pilot described as 'inadequate and almost criminally insufficient', in order to convince customers that moving from older 737s to the MAX does not require extensive retraining. All in all, there is ample evidence that Boeing put profits above safety.
While training is absolutely one (of many) factors in these crashes, it's worth noting that while the runaway stabilizer checklist response would save this plane, the symptoms of this runaway MCAS issue DO NOT MATCH those of a "normal" runaway stabilizer as pilots train on it in simulator.
Essentially, pilots are being called upon to recall a trained response based on input which is significantly different from any that they've seen in training. Other flight logs on Lion Air prior to the crash show that even when the pilots correctly hit upon flipping the stabilizer trim cut out, it took them minutes to realize that was the solution, and they only fully confirmed that when they tried turning it back on, experienced another pushover, and then cut it out for good.
Boeing's assertion that there was no need for additional simulator training for the Max series is clearly incorrect -- even in non-fatal incidents pilots have demonstrably and in multiple cases not been able to correctly recognize the MCAS runaway as a kind of Stabilizer Runaway without spending time searching for and running multiple checklists.