Comment by rurounijones | Hacker News Reader

Comment by rurounijones | Hacker News Reader

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> Response time is key. An F-16 hauling ass from Al Udeid will give me more than an A-10 hauling ass from Al Udeid.

Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.

Also, I have read articles:

* Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage)

* Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.

I can maybe see the F-35's sensor suite helping with the first one but not the second (Unless it is so good that it can reliably find targets on the ground even when the JTAC cannot be sure).

Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.

I am not an "A-10 forever" type but I find the "F-35 solves EVERYTHING" crowd to be a bit over-zealous and I have read enough about issues with the Airforce (brass especially) and its relationship with the CAS/COIN role to make me wonder about their ability to evaulate without bias.

I'm not arguing that the F-35 solves every problem here. I'm trying to deconstruct this weird interpretation of CAS that many people have.

> Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.

That's a bad way to frame it, I could just argue that a bunch of B-1s should have been at altitude already as well. I guess we'll prop up multiple airfields in Syria because .... well we don't have to, we'll just use other equally as good assets that can be rapidly fielded from regional bases. It simplifies cost, provides quick and effective fire all at a much lower risk. Ultimately the ground force commander builds their own stack and helps arrange and field assets before any major operation. In a low threat environment, hell yes have a bunch of A-10s in the stack ready to rock. But what about some ODA in Nigeria that randomly gets ambushed? That's how we need to be talking about CAS.

> Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage).

"Quoting JTACs" is like quoting the private news network in my eyes.

> Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.

I wouldn't say that the loiter time is what led to that outcome. Being all holed up in a COP on a mountain side isn't the best place to be in the first place. That's why local CAS must also come into the picture somewhere if you plan to sustain operations.

> Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.

Special mission stuff will always be special mission stuff. We still have OV-10s doing high speed shit in Iraq. That doesn't mean we should build more OV-10s. Tailored solutions are just that.

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