Wikileaks moves to Amazon's cloud to evade massive DDoS
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
Assange is knowingly putting himself in the line of fire, but isn't there a goal to make sure other members of wikileaks stay anonymous?
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/08/20...
Makes perfect sense actually. It'll be interesting to see what Amazon has to say about this.
I don't know much about wikileaks as an organisation but I expect most of their money comes as donations via the web site.
So, clearly having wikileaks.org up at high traffic times is important.
We are, sadly, not quite that far along yet.
Also, European national states are mostly too weak to have any influence in the global problems of the 21st century. A smaller share of a larger (power) pie would still be an improvement.
First install a working democratic process, then get more power. Not the other way around "lets give them insane power and then they will surely be nice to us and give us a good democratic process" as many people seem to want.
Also I'm not even sure that if there were a good democracy that I'd want to give e.g. Italians the power to vote on what happens to me, given that they elect and keep electing Berlusconi.
And yes, creating a "EU government" is almost certainly even harder than it appears. The current system seems to combine the speed of a multi-country democracy with the legitimacy of a multi-country oligarchy (of elected ministers, but still).
Caveat: IANAL (but my wife is).
However someone else pointed out they are hosted in us-west
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/11/29/wikileaks-using-amazo...
Or did you miss the past few years of security theatre and unwinnable wars?
Sheer pointlessness is meant to encompass several reasons I believe the USG is an unlikely culprit.
First, there's the risk of significant consequences if the USG's involvement comes to public light. There's another election in two years, so even the PR damage could cost them. Then there's the matter of this kind of action being illegal. Maybe no prosecution would occur, but maybe it would.
Second, unlike your security theater example, there is literally zero chance of this doing any good for anyone. Every person who is even the least bit interested could obtain the documents with only minor effort considering how widely they have been distributed. Major news organizations have already collated them for the masses.
On the other hand, "security theater" and "unwinnable wars" are only pointless in a debatable sense. There are obviously a large number of people who believe that airport security measures are having some positive effect. Similarly, by some metrics (not mine), the war in Iraq has been successful and the war in Afghanistan is heading in that direction too. I don't doubt in hindsight that they will prove to be mistakes, but that is not the same as their having a absolutely known "pointlessness" value now. So I think that objection of yours is incorrect as well.
Also, you've only pointed out two pointless things the USG has done in the past decade. That's not the same as proving that the USG is equally inclined to do pointless things as pointful ones. In fact, it may be that the USG discards pointless courses of action at a much higher rate than pointful ones, but that certain pointless actions have been enacted nonetheless. In this case, it would still be predictive of the US not being involved that the Wikileaks DOS is pointless.
Finally, I'm not aware that it is the USG's standard infosec policy to maintain batteries of compromised civilian computers with which to perform cyber warfare. Perhaps it is, but that would be quite a discovery in and of itself.
So, there are a lot of problems with your line of reasoning. I could be wrong, but I think the odds are something like 80-20 that I am right and this is not the USG's doing.
Note to other members: It's not OK to downmod someone for an opinion, especially not below zero.
08:57:41.211436 IP managed.unixy.net.49467 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: S 1398247905:1398247905(0) win 5840 <mss 1460,sackOK,timestamp 2031832550 0,nop,wscale 7>
08:57:41.264403 IP ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http > managed.unixy.net.49467: S 1288073904:1288073904(0) ack 1398247906 win 16384 <mss 1460>
08:57:41.264424 IP managed.unixy.net.49467 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: . ack 1 win 5840
08:57:41.318642 IP ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http > managed.unixy.net.49467: R 1288073905:1288073905(0) win 16384
The Reset packet sent from the EC2 node to the initiating node is a probe to identified non-existent nodes (spoofed). Notice in the above handshake that the initiating node didn't send a packet-response to the Reset. On the second consecutive attempt though all appears well (because the EC2 node added the initiating node to the ACL).
08:57:42.961708 IP managed.unixy.net.49468 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: S 1394481180:1394481180(0) win 5840 <mss 1460,sackOK,timestamp 2031832989 0,nop,wscale 7>
08:57:43.016547 IP ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http > managed.unixy.net.49468: S 1406181195:1406181195(0) ack 1394481181 win 5792 <mss 1460,sackOK,timestamp 26523835 2031832989,nop,wscale 3> 08:57:43.016564 IP managed.unixy.net.49468 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: . ack 1 win 46 <nop,nop,timestamp 2031833002 26523835>
08:57:51.100914 IP managed.unixy.net.49468 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: P 1:18(17) ack 1 win 46 <nop,nop,timestamp 2031835023 26523835>
08:57:51.180674 IP ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http > managed.unixy.net.49468: . ack 18 win 724 <nop,nop,timestamp 26525876 2031835023> 08:57:56.206546 IP managed.unixy.net.49468 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: P 18:39(21) ack 1 win 46 <nop,nop,timestamp 2031836300 26525876>
08:57:56.261630 IP ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http > managed.unixy.net.49468: . ack 39 win 724 <nop,nop,timestamp 26527146 2031836300>
08:57:56.678942 IP managed.unixy.net.49468 > ec2-184-72-37-90.us-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com.http: P 39:41(2) ack 1 win 46 <nop,nop,timestamp 2031836418 26527146>
But I wonder just how long they'll be able to evade the attack.
Regards
That being said, I wouldn't want to pay the bandwidth bill for the CDN :p
The advantage of this approach is that instead of relying on one ISV's backbone, you can build the constellation across several ISVs to aggregate the bandwidth and packet processing power.
Regards
EC2 and Cloudfront are powerful technologies, here's hoping they're transparent and publish their solutions/tools.
Question: why does the RST packet identify non-existent nodes? Doesn't TCP sequence prevent a blind continuation of a http request? Is this just one type of syn flood protection?
According to the RFC, the RST does not get an ACK if the initiating node is "legitimate." So the "silence" or non-ACK is a good sign, which results in the initiating node being added to the ACL. You don't want plain TCP handling this because of half-open TCP handshakes which can exhaust kernel data structures (memory) and CPU (from having the kernel sift through a large data set).
Regards
Doing a little googling this process seems to detect an attack (from a valid ip) that has been programmed to ignore RST - presumably because some intermediate ISPs (like tier1 borders) will detect a DDOS and forge a RST to attempt to mitigate them. Much like the firewall configs that circulated to defeat sandvine RST throttling of bittorrent.
Regards
They can always release their analysis and interesting findings later.
I'd say a botnet already qualifies as "the cloud". Why pay Amazon when you can get a million desktop machines doing it for free?
http://online.wsj.com/article/AP90b4520b2a9b455ea6e9d8d66fae...
The same would be true of any other cloud provider... are there any sizable cloud providers outside the US?
(Even if Assange has committed some violent crime on his own -- and I am not saying he has -- this is clearly not the purpose of the organization.)
They could try popularizing Freenet (which is already existing and is a fairly stable technology), but, again, I'd guess they probably have their hands full of other tasks already.
WikiLeaks hosts torrents. For example see the link "Click here to download full site in single archive" at the bottom of http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/. And, I believe, the content is already copied to (and being discussed at) Freenet and other similiar P2P networks.
there it is - i called it! http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1957189