If a candidate is not acceptable, you don't vote for them. The situation you're describing is not one of selecting from Ideal, Good, Bad; it's the situation of selecting from Ideal, Somewhat Bad, Bad. If you're unwilling to vote for a candidate, they are by definition not "Good" to you. So you would just vote for the Ideal candidate in that situation.
In the worse case (everyone just votes for a single candidate), AV simply acts as FPTP. In the average and best case, the candidate that is acceptable to the most voters wins.
Look at it from the view of the US's extreme polarization: if I'm strongly for A, and you're strongly against A, nothing will be done if A wins. But I'm strongly for A, and we're both "meh" on B, then B might not get everything done that either of us wants, but at least the process won't completely break down.
AV has a pretty significant "if I tick the good candidate box, am I impairing my ideal candidate's chances of winning?" problem.
No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both.
First you need to demonstrate that it's a problem in reality, there are very few times in history where it has been a real issue. Alternative to IRV are usually much more complex which is a terrible tradeoff for an almost entirely imaginary problem. Star voting has the same problem as star rating systems, almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1.
Then it will be similar to approval voting.
Previous comments complained that approval is bad because you cannot express detailed preferences, but you say no one wants to anyway? So then approval is ok?