It's also possible that some of the materials violate copyright, and so hosting it would violate Amazon's AUP. Works authored by government employees within the scope of their employment will be public domain so most of the material is probably OK, but is all of it?
Finally, under the law on the books, I believe it is illegal to make much of the material available, and hosting illegal content violates the AUP. (And could get Amazon in trouble). It is possible that under the Supreme Court decision in the Pentagon Papers case that the First Amendment would override that.
I say "possible" because it doesn't seem at all certain to me. That case was largely, I seem to recall, about prior restraint, and it was kind of a fuzzy decision.
Amazon just wants to host stuff. If there is some serious question over whether it is legal or not, I don't think they want (or should be expected to want) to be the ones to deal with that fight--that's for whoever wants to actually publish the documents.
Wikileaks is pursuing a remarkably old-school method of releasing these, with the whole centralized distribution point.
They should release the entire set via P2P with collections symmetrically encrypted. They could then -- via the most rudimentary methods -- release individual keys at chosen intervals to still obtain the same throttled response. And one day when the feds are kicking in the doors, just drop the entire key collection.
I imagine the day somebody figures out how to make a HTTP-compatible P2P network that allows you to browse web pages hosted on bittorrent will be the day WikiLeaks moves to P2P.
There's no reason they can't do both.
They may want to verify the authenticity of the documents to avoid fake leaks. They may also want to edit some documents to remove data that would put individual persons at risk, like they did with Cablegate.
Doing this takes time, and may not be short-circuited easily.
They can't simply encrypt the files, release them using P2P, and then edit them / check them for authenticity. I guess it would be useful as an insurance, though.
And if something happened to them...well it's going to be discovered anyways.
Well, no. Competently done crypto is uncrackable for all practical purposes without side-channel attacks. Or, maybe, quantum computers (RSA; but why would you use RSA for this?)
Note that I'm talking crypto: the OpenSSL people seem quite able to make all sorts of mistakes, but it's almost never the crypto itself that is at fault. (Today's news: a workaround for Netscape's stupidities apparently allows attackers to downgrade to a worse protocol suite in certain cases. Stupid bug, but not crypto per se.)
So yes, there are errors, but publishing something AES-encrypted and giving away, say, half the key doesn't tell us anything about those.
e.g. Some asymmetric so that I could encrypt something easily but then require someone who wants to decrypt the message to perform 100 Trillion operations to decrypt it?
It may be possible to reduce variance in cracking times by requiring multiple cracks (use a secret sharing scheme to break up the "real" key in chunks; encrypt each chunk in a crackable way.)
Maybe send them a email?
As for the visibility of Wikileaks, I think that what matters is that journalists get the files. That's how most people hear of them. So it wouldn't really matter if they were released in a distributed P2P fashion, as long as the files are easy to find and recognize (f.ex. Wikileaks-01-01-2010-003.PGP or whatever).
http://thepiratebay.org/torrent/5728614/Wikileaks__insurance...
Please could you clarify what you mean. According to cablegate.wikileaks.org the distribution is being done via torrent (with an increasingly large number of seeds becoming available quickly).
http://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/cablegate/cablegate-201012...