I was asking my first question in a potential series.
How do you determine whether a claim is about reality?
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>> Can't something be true regardless of whether or not it's being represented?
> How would you evaluate a proposition without having it represented anywhere? If that is not what you mean: Well, what do you mean then?
Again, as I've stated before (and asked a question that you didn't answer, which turns out to be pertinent here):
>>>> I can do an evaluation, and that would require representation, but my evaluation is to find that [something] is true, not to make it true. I agree that immaterial computation is not possible, but computation is not what is being discussed. Do you think that the [truth of the] statement "'1 < 2' is true under the Peano axioms" is dependent on something material?
To add to my previous statement on this having nothing to do with evaluation, and to provide a realistic thought experiment: If someone says "A diamond is on the moon", either it is true or it is not, regardless of its representation or evaluation. Evaluating the claim as true would require observing the diamond on the moon, but that "A diamond is on the moon" is either true or not before such an observation takes place.
So, my question "Can't something be true regardless of whether or not it's being represented?" is attempting to ask if the truth of some claim is true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation.
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>>> Every instance of Peano axioms that I can think of has a physical representation, just as every instance of cake that I can think of has physical representation.
>> Wouldn't that be because you can't think of those things without a representation, not because they are dependent upon a representation?
> ... How would we know? Maybe we can, I don't know, ...
By the reasons I've been giving... By the fact that symbols and concepts are not the things they represent.
> ... wouldn't you agree that in order to build an argument on it, there should be more to show than "I can put the words 'immaterial cake' together", when all the cake we've ever seen was material?
Where have I put the words 'immaterial' and 'axioms' together without first attempting to build up a reason to do so?
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>> So what material(s) are the Peano axioms composed of?
> That's a category error?
Are you asking me or telling me? If you're telling me it is a category error, why?
> What material(s) are movies composed of?
Image frames. How is this a challenge to my question?
> (obviously, "immaterial" here meaning "existing without being represented in matter", just as I used it for the Peano axioms)
Do you think that the Peano axioms are material or not material?
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> I take it that you mean that it is scientific observation demonstrating the existence of the potential for the universe to be in different states?
Yes.
> So ... do you agree then that that is not an example of non-physical reality (which is what you originally proposed it as)?!
No. The existence of non-physical reality has been demonstrated by scientific observation. The non-physical reality itself was not observed in order to do so.
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>> I'd probably say a reason for someone to care about morality would be if they cared to maximize joy/happiness in themselves and others.
> Hu? How did we get there?! I mean, that sure sounds like a good reason to care about something if it gets you there, I just don't see how this reason is connected to your definition!?
Implicit in my reason is the claim that when one acts according to God's will they will attain maximal joy/happiness.
> Also, isn't joy and happiness quite accessible to empirical study?
The effects of joy and happiness, yes, joy and happiness itself, I don't know.
> Aren't you implicitly saying that it is a category error to ask for evidence that certain acts increase or diminish joy or happiness?
No.
> Or what would you suggest people to do when they do as Jane/God wants, but they observe decrease in joy and happiness? Do it anyway, because otherwise they aren't eating what is pleasurable/they aren't moral? Or stop eating what they observe to be causing them to puke because a definition of "a pleasure to eat" that makes them puke is kinda useless?
Not as mechanical as this, but to answer your question in short: "the global maximum of joy/happiness is achieved through acting according to God's will for your entire life, so don't let dips in local joy/happiness deter you from abiding by God's will".