Report deems Russia a pioneer in GPS spoofing attacks
zdnet.com
zdnet.com
Just news, mentioning this, back to 2016 https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/11/07/gpsoff/
Nice write up, also from 2016 https://meduza.io/feature/2016/10/19/teleportatsiya-iz-kreml...
News from Jan, 2018 https://snob.ru/news/156463
Nov, 2018 https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2018/11/12/786188-kre...
Hope that helps!
P.S. And yes, I personally see this behaviour near Kremlin. It's almost impossible to order a taxi nearby.
- works best on desktop though
Not sure why it's not possible to order a taxi, since you're not supposed to provide your own coordinates but rather a point where you want to be picked up.
Grigory Bakunov did some research
https://telegram.me/addmeto (Search on 'GLONASS' on [19.10.16])
Translated in part -
"That's what I found out: somewhere inside the Kremlin there is (and probably is moving) a powerful transmitter. It simulates the operation of the GPS and GLONASS satellite at L1 frequencies and makes noise at L2 and L5 frequencies. "
(Spoofs civilian, blocks military)
He thinks the airport is chosen randomly, not to geo-block drones which is a bit of a strange idea.
"These coordinates can be entered directly or selected from the list offered by the device manufacturer. It so happened that in these lists for Russia appear only the centers of large cities and Airports. As you understand, Vnukovo is the first alphabetically located airport in the Moscow region. And in this version I also believe, of course."
Is that actually the case?
While the US can spend a lot more on its military and has a corresponding lead, the US is mostly focused on offensive technology (like its carrier groups). Russia, being geographically much closer to "enemy" territory, has a much bigger focus on defensive capabilities and excels in many areas. For example the Russian S400 air defense system is usually seen as superior to the American Patriot system.
With GPS spoofing being mostly a defensive technology it seems exactly like the thing Russia would focus on and the US would neglect.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=YS4i2InVB-Y
Although I will give the Russians props for possibly being the first nation to land the missile back in its own tube. https://youtu.be/gNNkRuSw_0Q?t=52
Or do you mean you worked on one of them and therefore can compare them (without experience of the other)?
Interesting how truth can be too much for fiction sometimes.
However a replay attack that uses a valid signal received at some other locate re-broadcast at a second place is not affected by encryption. You can imagine lots of clever ways to use a re-broadcast attack to draw a drone off course.
That seems like a pretty obvious and absurd sort of vulnerability.
It is, however, a very long-standing issue that has been addressed by some of the best minds in physics and technology, with many billions of dollars available to them.
Do you have any suggestions?
Or it least allow for it's detection?
You can always store 'last known location', the rest is math. The military has/will have this.
However this is a non-issue at the moment for auto, and with 5G/autonomous coming out, GPS might be seeing its last useful days in my part.
And in the case of a ferry, the user is expecting to have accurate location and nav instructions very quickly after key-on as they leave the port in the new place, so that mechanism needs to make its decision pretty fast.
If you want to spoof more expensive gear, like those used in commercial shipping, you do it gradually. You start by transmitting the correct coordinates and then gradually start to increase the difference between correct and false coordinates. When done gradually, IMU can't detect GPS spoofing.
Unfortunately many otherwise good navigation systems are not doing even the bare minimum to detect spoofing. It's not the cost. Spoofing protection has not been priority.
https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-suc...
If that's not an option you can use an IMU, but because of errors adding up over time IMUs aren't all that great if you can't calibrate from time to time. Satellites do it by looking at stars, if you're a car you might look at the streets and compare them to maps.
The only things that really have fundamental problems without GPS are ships and anything that flies over water. In any other application GPS is used because it's cheap to implement and reliable, not because it's the only way to do it.
In the example presented some of the inputs could include direction finding to local broadcasters, a GLONASS receiver, a heading indicator and distance traveled odometer if we're talking a road vehicle, and many other things limited only by your imagination and resources at hand.
GPS was created in part to allow the US to measure the world precisely enough in peacetime that they have an accurate model to feed their IMUs in wartime. It was never designed to be a robust navigation system even though everyone commonly uses it that way.
Perhaps there is some reserved field, or usually ignored message, that can be used to insert digital signatures. The DoD will keep the master key, so the signatures could be easily verified, but spoofing them would be nearly impossible.
Tl;dr: nope.
There is no such thing in GNSS systems. They are the ground truth. There is no way to combat a replay attack without some second source which would obviate much of what a GNSS delivers.
There are other possibilities (CTR/CFB encryption modes, relying on increasing counter and/or previous messages contents).
Or am I missing something? Could you please describe the attack vector with these assumptions?
GPS time is broadcast in the very low bit rate (50 BPS) NAV message, once every 6 seconds. In between the receiver counts at the chip rate (1023 kHz) just counting signal transitions.
A rebroadcast attack happens at the speed of light. A signal is received at Moscow airport and is beamed to the Kremlin via some alternate transport path. At the Kremlin the signal is broadcast immediately at higher power than is possible for the direct signal. This happens at the speed of light.
There is nothing you can do about this without access to a clock that is at least as precise as the GPS satellite's multi-million-dollar onboard clock, which you then somehow keep correctly synchronized at all times.
There are some things that can be done to detect rebroadcast in the RF domain by looking at time of arrival across an antenna array, but again, that's not going to happen in a cell phone or wrist appliance.
There are some techniques that are used to discern direct path signals from multipath ones which involve tracking the lower power level signals, but rebroadcasters make sure they are radiating enough power to put that technique outside the dynamic range of the receiver.
Now if this "exact" time suddenly jumps (compared to internal clock), it probably means that the signal is not coming directly from the satellites, but relayed from Vnukovo.
One guy claims he found building with the jammer: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiy2Mt79M1c (device and process is described in [1], russian), he uses self-made “radar” [2].
[1]: https://habr.com/ru/post/337608/ [2]: https://habr.com/en/post/332746/
Military receivers used by the USA and NATO allies can easily detect spoofing because they listen for signals on separate frequencies reserved for military use, with higher precision. On these frequencies, all traffic is encrypted using a private key that only the DoD has access to (in theory). In this case, it is easy to detect spoofing because your enemy cannot encrypt signals using the DoD's private key (they just don't have it). If the receiver is unable to decrypt the incoming signal (key mismatch), it knows there is something fishy going on. I would also speculate there are additional countermeasures which are not publicly available.
Kremlin is trianle-like shaped, there's river from one side with bridges at the ends (so it could be counted as a tunnel), Red Square from another (pedestrian only unless you're a member of Victory Parade, one-way streets aside), the third side is surrounded by Mokhovaya street which has 5 intersections with others and you can get to the one you'd want if you've skipped your turn.
I would have thought that the military level GPS signals might have something similar already.
GPS spoofing can be done as a replay attack; record the signal at the airport, rebroadcast at the Kremlin louder than the direct satellite signal and voilà, your receiver says you’re at the airport.
As it’s just a replay attack of the original signal, encryption can’t help.
Couldn't this be mitigated by added a nonce or using CBC within the cryptosystem? Replay attacks are well understood; I'd be surprised if any (eventual) proposal for signed/encrypted GPS didn't include something to defend against them.
The receiver sees the rebroadcast because it captures the receiver's RF chain by being the strongest signal.
* So the media claims as a fact. Twitter itself has actually made no such claim of certainty that the "Russian trolls" are actually Russian, rather they've only said that the accounts are possibly linked, but good luck finding a news article or internet forum reader that will acknowledge this fact. This Wired article is about the only one I've come across that is truthful:
https://www.wired.com/story/how-americans-wound-up-on-twitte...
As an example of how sloppy and misleading (intentionally or not) this problem (of reporting allegations or suspicions as if they are fact) is, Wired itself made the very same mistake in an article linked from that one:
https://www.wired.com/story/congress-asks-tech-to-face-hard-...
While Facebook bore the brunt of Senators' questioning, Twitter revealed some staggering statistics about Russia's organic reach on its platform last year. In just two and a half months, Russian bot accounts tweeted 1.4 million times, yielding 288 million impressions. The fact that such coordinated campaigns went unchecked underscores the value Twitter has put on free speech.
"Russian bot accounts tweeted" is a statement of fact, but the actual fact is the accounts are only suspected of being Russian
Ironically, in the very same article, they go on to acknowledge the uncertainty involved:
Facebook and other platforms used their technological prowess during the campaign to identify malicious actors and advertisers that might be connected to foreign entities, but those tools can miss the mark.
One can hardly blame the technically unsophisticated general public from taking what it reads in respectable news outlets at face value, but it's rather depressing (or, extremely interesting, from a mass psychology/epistemological perspective, if you're more of a half glass full type of guy like me) that not only politicians but also technically sophisticated people seem to be no better in this particular case.
</beatingadeadhorse>
These days most negative statements about Russia are accepted at face value.
Here we have a situation where people of above-average intelligence, especially technically, passionately believe something of a technical nature, and will not question it. That's the part I find absolutely fascinating within the context of the whole "fake news" discussion.
Mind you this does not automatically implicate Russia, just because one report calls them pioneers doesn't mean other countries don't posses the capability and China has more concrete issues with US naval presence there than Russia.
The US military is very, very good at exotic inertial measurement technology, doubly so for a platform like a ship with few power/weight limitations. It is a cornerstone of their technology advantage.