Great, and now you have the other problem the MCAS was supposed to mitigate (the tendency of the MAX to do backflips).
Great, and now you have the other problem the MCAS was supposed to mitigate (the tendency of the MAX to do backflips).
Better than the plane flying itself into the ground.
The plane is only certified to be 'identical to the 737' when MCAS is on, and operating correctly.
If MCAS has to be disabled in response to a common mechanical problem, then the plane must be re-certified.
If you were in a position MCAS would have to kick in, you were at positive AoA, reduced thrust would impart a negative AoA moment.
I don't think that is correct. I think you're still thinking of the angle of the plane with respect to the horizon, not the AoA.
If reducing thrust reduced AoA, then you could recover from a stall by reducing thrust. In reality, the opposite is the case. The only way to recover from a stall by manipulating engine thrust is to increase it (though this won't always be sufficient by itself).
Fiddling with engines in an MCAS activation situation would just offset the flight envelope into a more dangerous zone, that could be even more difficult to recover from.
Took me a bit, but I got there.