Showing the name of the "signer" in the address bar, instead of the server where the content is actually hosted goes against decades of browser UI design.
Good on Mozilla for marking it as harmful.
Showing the name of the "signer" in the address bar, instead of the server where the content is actually hosted goes against decades of browser UI design.
Good on Mozilla for marking it as harmful.
Does it though? If you use Cloudflare or Akamai or Cloudfront or Netlify or etc. etc. then what shows up in the URL bar is not the server where the content is actually hosted. Well, it is the server where it is hosted, it's just one of the many domains hosted by that server.
Just because Google invented it doesn't make it bad.
It changes the meaning of the address bar from "this is who I'm talking to" to "this is who (at some point in time) signed this content".
I don't mind that you can sign and verify content, that's fine and useful. I'm just not a fan of changing the address bar's meaning.
What I'm saying is that this does not change the meaning of what's in the URL bar. It's the same as before. It tells you who published the content originally.
No, it tells you the origin of the document. If you are the creator, and you choose to put your content on server X it will tell you "I've got this from server X". Whether that server is a reverse proxy or a shared webhost or a dedicated server in a DC or a raspberry pi running on your desk doesn't matter - it's the designated original that you, the owner of example.org chose.
That's what it always meant, and it changes when you do a redirect, and it shows you the current URL even if there is a canonical header of http-equiv. I can put a reverse proxy on my host and proxy example.com to example.org - the address bar tells you that you're reading example.com, not example.org, as it should, because you're connected to me, not to example.org.
How is it more secure? If, as you say, DNS can be spoofed easily - I can easily get a certificate issued with the required extension and make a "cryptographically signed package".
Spoofing DNS to clients is much easier than spoofing DNS to certificate authorities. Otherwise domain-validated HTTPS certs wouldn't mean much.
Do a trace route on any domain and you'll see that the server isn't the one that give you the answer, but some intermediary. Sure in that case when you did the request, the content is fresh and the server answered RIGHT NOW, but that cache still get the content from the server, it's just a bit older.