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So, the linked article is an updated version of an earlier article in the EE times. In the comments section, a reader (ie) Frankly, I am astonished that a single point of failure (AOA) could make it through a FMEA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis). For those who are unfamiliar, a FMEA is (basically) looking at each part of a system and saying "What happens if it breaks?". Having worked in commercial vehicle software development, I am astonished as well.

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It appears it made it through because Boeing didn't reveal that MCAS can incrementally mistrim until it has overpowered the pilots. They may even have added that capability after going through the initial certification.

I don't work in this field. Do you have to publish the findings from this analysis? Is it possible that no such analysis was done because the MCAS system had to be kept quiet?

Yes, you do, as part of certification. Boeing misrepresented the degree of control MCAS has and was able to avoid making it a redundant system as a result. Layperson's description here:

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...

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