I've also taken issue with Plaid. [0]
In Plaid's case, the issue is twofold: (a) the chilling effect of "training to get scammed," as you mention; (b) the fact that Plaid's servers log into your bank account on your behalf without clearly disclosing that to the user (unless you have 2FA enabled, in which case they will helpfully instruct you to "disable extra security settings at sign-on"). In fact, it's worse than no disclosure, because Plaid imitates the branding of the login page of your bank.
The solution is obvious, although maybe less than palatable to the Plaid marketing department. Plaid needs to be extremely clear that it is logging into your bank account on your behalf (including detailed statements about security architecture and data retention). They should also stop appropriating the logos and login branding of banks.
In the case that Plaid is not doing this (maybe a few years from now every bank finally has an API, or maybe you use a bank that has one now), then they should use proper third party authorization flow with the bank, where the user explicitly grants privileges from their bank account to Plaid.
Regarding the topic at hand -- Stripe Checkout -- it's a bit disingenuous to equate its flow with Plaid's. The major difference is that Stripe is not logging into your bank account on your behalf without informing you.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18654880#18655712